Poetry and the Historical Imagination in Post-‘Abbāsid Historiography: A Close Reading of Two marṭiyyas on the Fall of Baghdad

Niko Banac
University of Alicante (Spain)

Introduction

The difference between a historian and a poet is not that one writes in prose and the other in verse –indeed the writings of Herodotus could be put into verse and yet would still be a kind of history, whether written in metre or not. The real difference is this, that one tells what happened and the other what might happen. That is why poetry is more philosophical than, and superior to, history –for poetry tends to speak of universals, but history particulars.

Aristotle, Poetics. Book IX, 1451b (Armstrong, 447-455)

This paper will address an often-neglected aspect of pre-modern Islamic historiography: the relationship between historical narrative and poetry. When reading the works of certain 20th century Islamicists on the role of poetry in Islamic historiography, one could easily conclude that poems in Islamic historiographical texts are worthy of consideration merely as repositories of facts or as lists, a sort of amorphous glue that plugs the gaps in the historical narrative, as seen in Rosenthal’s (Rosenthal 1968, 181) contention about poetry according to which “poems in no way form part of historiography.” Such a view of necessity ignores the relevance of poetry as a historical text in and of itself, not to mention the rhetorical functions of poetry and its relationship to narrative structure, as well as other types of “knowing,” epistemic categories apart from those of history. This purely “empirical” approach also obscures the value of poetry for probing deeper questions of authorial intent, or, with an eye to late 20th century trends in literary theory, the place of authorial agency in the poems themselves, as well as in the broader historical narratives in which they are quoted (Hirschler, 122).

According to Aristotle’s Poetics, history and poetry are not merely separate genres but distinct modes of interpretation with distinct epistemologies. For Aristotle, the question of the primacy of poetry hinges on its mimetic craft; Herodotus could well be put into verse, yet this would only amount to a “kind of history” (ἱστορία τις). The virtue of poetry that elevates it above history is that it relates things that “might happen” and not merely those “which happened.” This distinction can help light the way for probing the relationship between history and poetry in classical Islamic historiography, insofar as it delineates a mimetic distinction between two separate genres. As J. M. Armstrong writes:

---

1 I would like to thank Prof. Francisco Franco-Sanchez of the University of Alicante, Prof. Josep Puig of the Complutense University of Madrid, Profesor Michael Cooperson of UCLA, Professor Michael Morony of UCLA, as well as Prof. Shawkat Toorawa of Yale University for their help with this article.

2 Franz Rosenthal’s assessment regarding the relevance of poetry for Islamic historiography sets the tone for this tendency (Rosenthal 1968, 181): “The impact of history upon the contemporary scene could be celebrated in poems, or mourned […] All these poems are valuable for our understanding of the history of their time, but in no way do they form part of historiography.”
The comparison of poetry with history [...] is made on the basis of how excellent they are - meaning, presumably, that composing good drama or epic requires more understanding, more grasp of relations among universals, than does reporting on past events (Armstrong, 449).

According to Armstrong, the key to understanding this distinction is found in Aristotle’s theory of universals and particulars in *De Interpretatione* chapter 7, 17a:

By ‘universal’ I mean that which by its nature is predicated of many things, and by ‘particular’ that which is not. For example, ‘human being’ is of the universals but Callias is of the particulars (Armstrong, 449).

Here, the great salience of poetry stems from its universal scope, which historical prose cannot communicate as effectively. Aristotle’s perspective on the relationship between history and poetry provides us with a welcome opportunity for an examination of the relationship between the two genres in Arabic historiographical texts that goes beyond questions of factuality, empiricism or philological relevance. Instead, Aristotle’s taxonomy places great emphasis on the text in its rhetorical fullness rather than relegating it to a mere repository of facts.

In the study of pre-modern Islamic historiography, Franz Rosenthal’s efforts marked one of the first attempts to articulate a theory of historical writing in works of classical Islamic history. But in Rosenthal’s view, as we shall see later, poetry has little or no importance for history. Though there may be some reason for excluding poetry from the “bread and butter” issues that are central to compiling historical data, Rosenthal’s willingness to dismiss poetry altogether ultimately risks reducing poems, as well as their authors and the texts within which they are quoted, to something wholly irrelevant for our understanding of the Islamic historiographical tradition (Rosenthal 1968, 181). This in turn implies taking Arabic histories at face value while forgetting what these histories meant to their audiences, what diverse functions they served, the manner in which they were composed, as well as their relevance to other forms of knowledge in classical Islam. Notwithstanding Rosenthal’s willingness to dismiss poetry as irrelevant for historiography, one is still faced with the same questions that undoubtedly faced his generation of scholars: did the historians writing in Arabic see poetry as a genre unrelated to history? Even if the two genres are distinct in many ways, does this warrant the imposition of such a divide? Or is it perhaps more useful to consider the relevance of poetry on a more equal footing with the role of prose in the composition of historical narrative?

This paper will examine a very specific case in post-’Abbāsid historiography with an eye to some of the less obvious dilemmas concerning poetry and its place in the Islamic and especially the post-’Abbāsid historiographical tradition. It will offer a comparative reading of two ‘elegies’ (*marṯiyya*) on the fall of Baghdad to the Mongols in 656/1258, one quoted in Pseudo-Ibn al-Fuwaṭi’s *al-Hawādīṯ al-ḡāmi’a wa-taḡārib al-nāfī’ah fi l-mi’ah al-sāb’iَa wa-taḡārib al-nāfī’ah fi l-mi’āh al-sāb’iَa* (*The Comprehensive Events and Beneficial Trials in the Seventh Century*) ([Pseudo-] Ibn al-Fuwaṭi) and the other in al-Ḍahābi’s *Tārīḫ al-islām* (‘History of Islam’) (Al-Ḍahābi).

This paper will first attempt to delineate the relationship between the poems and the narratives in which they are quoted by treating the poems both as independent texts governed by the conventions of poetic expression in the Arabic literary tradition, as well

---

3 The position of poetry in medieval Arabic historical texts is worth noting, since poems are frequently placed at the end of a specific historical account as a kind of coda.
as examining them as part of the broader historical narrative within which they are cited. By probing the interstices between the two, history as poetry versus history as prose, this paper will attempt to come to some more general conclusions about the existence and nature of historical consciousness, or, with an eye to Collingwood, the presence of “historical imagination” among the poets themselves and the authors who quote them. This paper will address the question of what the category of “historical imagination” might entail for broader theoretical approaches to Islamic historiography. Here, a brief treatment of contemporary trends in Islamic historiography will help show what is at stake in asking the question in the first place.

Poetry in Islamic Historiographical Texts: Recent Perspectives

It is useful to begin with Rosenthal, whose magnum opus, History of Muslim Historiography (1952, sec. ed. 1968), despite its datedness, still stands as a milestone in 20th century Islamic studies and is important for understanding the development of modern Western scholarship on classical Islamic historiography. In Rosenthal’s general approach toward Islamic history, the “decline model” looms large and is perhaps itself central to understanding Rosenthal’s worldview. In Rosenthal’s assessment, Islamic historiography as a whole is cast as a science devoid of intellectual depth and originality:

The particular kind of material usefulness which in our thinking attaches primarily to historiography was unknown to Muslim historians: History was not used as a means for the propagation of ideas, or, more exactly, historians as a rule did not consciously intend, in writing their works, to reinterpret historical data so as to conform to the ideas they might have wished to propagate (Rosenthal 1968, 62).

This tendency to discount an element of intellectual depth in Islamic historiography has garnered much criticism. The fuller implication of Rosenthal’s assessment of Islamic historiography makes it difficult to posit the existence of an “intellectual history” per se in Islamic historiography. For Rosenthal, Islamic historiography is a closed book, a finite continuum of facts that might contain some semblance of order but whose authors were largely unimportant followers of a set script of historical writing.

It is not surprising that Rosenthal took an equally dim view of the relevance of poetry to historical writing. For, if historians as independent thinkers do not exist in Rosenthal’s understanding of Islamic historiography, poets are even less important. As Rosenthal informs us (Rosenthal 1968, 181): “it seems evident that the historical import of the events with which the poets dealt was of little or no concern to most of them” [Italics mine]. This remark, according to which poets were not concerned with the historical events that they described in their poems, has raised objections among later generations of scholars of Islamic historiography.

Several noted historians of early Islam have made attempts to think outside the bounds of Rosenthal’s assessments of Islamic historiography inherent limitations, and without their contributions, the impulse behind this paper would probably not be realizable. One of the first historians to attempt a different approach to classical Islamic historiography

---

4 “The problems of the relation of history as narrative to history as occurrences are not distinct from the problems of the relation of history as narrative or mythos to history as argument or logos. Questions concerning the bearing of history on truth should be formulated historically to take into account the relations of the description, […] or narration of concrete facts and events to the formulation […] of hypotheses […] even when they depend on philosophic, scientific, or esthetic principles and arts” (McKeon, 43).

5 “Within [Rosenthal’s] analytical framework, the only possible major development is the genre’s decay parallel to the general decline of the civilization” (Hirschler, 2).
was Marshall G. Hogdson. In a seminal essay published in 1968 (the same year as the second edition of *History of Muslim Historiography*) entitled “Two Pre-Modern Muslim Historians: Pitfalls and Opportunities in Presenting them to Moderns,” Hogdson attempts to do precisely that which Rosenthal deemed impossible: to study the very composition of historical texts rather than focusing solely on their content (Hodgson, 53). Hogdson thus begins by stressing the importance of not confusing our modern epistemological criteria with those of pre-modern Muslim historians:

In the histories we are discussing, it is a different sense of facts on the one hand and of total vision on the other that imposes the greatest obstacle to our understanding. For our two historians [Al-Ṭabarî and Abulfazl], accuracy as to “fact” was much less important than *validity as to life-vision* [Italics mine] (Hodgson, 62).

Nor does Hogdson mince words when identifying the problem at the heart of the field:

Reductivism is the habit of mind of those historians who occupy themselves, indeed, with a great piece of work, but who treat it as merely the sum of ingredients that are not great. Great historic deeds can be so handled, or philosophies, or works of art –where everything is precisely dated and measured, and “influences” and techniques are probed and proven, but nothing is said about what was actually done […] I am afraid that we have such tendencies at their very worst in my particular field (Hodgson, 64-65).

The solution, according to Hodgson, is to go beyond the bounds of a rigidly conceived empiricism:

It will already be becoming apparent, what is required in our quest to make the pre-Modern masterpieces meaningful to Moderns. To *transcend the presuppositions about the very nature of creativity that Modernity imposes on us*, to escape the subtle influences of loyalty to our particular heritage, even to overcome the dilemmas and pitfalls of specialism [Italics mine] (Hodgson, 66).

Hodgson provides an instructive example of this nuanced historicism in his reading of al-Ṭabarî’s description of ʿUṭmān’s murder, which consists of two contradictory accounts:

The first and last anecdotes in the set [account of ʿUṭmān’s murder] stand apart from the chronological sequence and suggest, with the help of other anecdotes in the set, that the fault lay in basic dilemmas of power, which evoked honest differences of opinion; and they even hint at something of Ṭabarî’s own solution. The reader, then, can (if he is so inclined) read the passages as an apologia for the subsequent Sunni position on the nature of the Muslim community. But the perceptive reader will be forced to consider the alternative presented, which is equally orthodox, but on a totally different level, and which will force him to see the far-reaching problem of power which lay at the heart of the Muslim dilemma; and so to appreciate more fully the meaning of the effort of the Muslim legists to create a law that can by-pass the holders of power (Hodgson, 57).

For Hodgson the full significance of al-Ṭabarî’s account begins to emerge once the relationship between its disparate strands is examined. Such an approach requires an understanding of the historian as author, and with it, a willingness to go beyond a text’s historicity and to look instead to its literary elements. In a recent article on accounts of
‘Uṯmān’s murder in three ‘Abbāsid chronicles, Heather Keaney points to the necessity of such a literary approach, one which is directly indebted to Hodgson’s legacy. As Keaney writes:

The very structure of Islamic chronicles that made them resistant to traditional historiographical analysis, made them particularly receptive to new approaches in literary criticism (Keaney, 37-65).

In the 1990’s, Tarif Khalidi and Tayeb el-Hibri made crucial contributions toward the application of new approaches to the study of Islamic historiography which were implicit in Hodgson’s critique but had yet to find their full expression (Khalidi; El-Hibri 1999; 2010). Khalidi’s contribution lay in delineating the different “epistemic domes” of classical Islamic historiography written in Arabic, whereas Tayeb el-Hibri’s analysis of the diverse rhetorical functions of early ‘Abbāsid histories showed precisely how a more literary approach to Islamic historical texts might look. It is worth noting that Khalidi begins his study by insisting on the importance of the literary element, while also pointing to the difficulty that it poses for historians:

For historians, literary traditions are the most complex of subjects. They do not possess the familiar contours of events. They do not lend themselves easily to classification as to their beginning, middle or end. When speaking of them, historians often use metaphors of transparency like ‘atmospheres’ or ‘climates’. How they come into existence and how they relate to their environment are notoriously difficult problems. The normal tools of the historical trade […] do not seem to work so well when traditions are investigated. Traditions are untidy and the elements that enter into their make-up themselves belong to the debris of earlier traditions (Khalidi, 1).

El-Hibri understands the difficulty of reading the ‘Abbāsid chronicles as a facet of the myriad intricacies of the texts’ very composition:

With the appropriate level of immersion into the cultural, political, and religious signs of the age, and with a sensitivity to the issue of debate and a feel for the fabric of expression, one can recognize the intended roads of meaning. Although on occasion ambiguous, these texts do form a cohesive array of narratives that were meant to be read in a specific way, even when that way is in itself indeterminate (El-Hibri 1999, 15).

For, as El-Hibri concludes:

[T]he historical accounts of the early ‘Abbāsid caliphs were originally intended to be read not for facts, but for their allusive power. Their descriptions of the lives of caliphs may seem realistic, but the narrators intended their anecdotes to form a frame for social, political and religious commentary (El-Hibri 1999, 216).

In this vein, more recent studies by two German scholars point to the rhetorical dimension of Islamic historiographical texts. For Kurt Franz, compilatio served a specific purpose in both the Medieval Latin and Islamic historical traditions:

Erstens ist nicht bekannt, dass die arabischen Geschichtsschreiber ähnlich wie die lateinischen Schriftsteller von der Praxis der Kompilation zu einer ausgesprochenen und selbstbewussten Auffassung von dieser Tätigkeit weitergegangen wären, welche sich dann durch einen zentralen methodologischen
Begriff in Entsprechung zu compilation ausgedrückt und legitimierte hätte (Franz, 22).

Perhaps to a greater extent than any of the aforementioned scholars, Konrad Hirschler focuses precisely on the literary dimension of historical writing in post-‘Abbāsid chronologies. Basing his approach on ideas gleaned from Hayden White’s *Metahistory*, as well as the works of Northrop Frye and Erich Auerbach, Hirschler begins his study by identifying the very problem of framing the question of authorial presence in the texts at hand.

Thus, according to Hirschler, “[t]he main question is how the authors ascribed different meanings to their immediate past, although they largely drew on a common textual basis” (4). Central to Hirschler’s thesis is a careful probing of the relevance of the arrangement of a text’s disparate units as well as the narrative form, which would come to encompass it:

[…] the criterion for inclusion of information was not necessarily their truth-value but possibly their significance within a specific context […] with regard to narrativity, the basic concern comes down to the question of how medieval authors fashioned originally isolated and disparate facts and events into a literary narrative (Hirschler, 4).

The answer lies in probing “literary elements” and their interplay:

[…] literary elements refers to the integration of different means in order to narrate a specific report. The textual strategies included such elements as direct speech with shifts between first and third person, oaths, poetry, letters, quotations from sacred texts and overt authorial intervention (Hirschler, 6).

Hirschler’s approach, though obvious and simple in its formulation, cannot be stated clearly enough, since it offers the possibility of formulating a historical hermeneutics capable of going beyond rigidly defined boundaries of historicity and empiricism.

**The Fall of Baghdad in Pseudo-Ibn al-Fuwaṭī and al-Ḏahabī: Narrative Devices and Narrative Structure**

Perhaps one of the most traumatic defeats in the history of Islam, the fall of Baghdad in 656 H./1258 e.C. was an event of great significance in post-‘Abbāsid historiography. Hulagu’s devastation threatened the most basic assumptions underlying Sunni Muslim identity, which had by now come to define itself as a conscious relic of the legacy of the five-hundred year old ‘Abbāsid *dawla*. Thus, while Hulagu’s physical threat to Sunni Islam lasted only briefly, the psychological trauma of 656/1258 left an unresolved anxiety. The execution of the caliph al-Musta’ṣim marked the end of ‘Abbāsid political authority in Iraq. It also accelerated profound shifts in the political, religious and cultural configuration of the Islamic world, which had already been underway during the previous centuries due to the gradual erosion of caliphal authority, as the caliph’s imprimatur shifted from the political to the religious realm.

This paper will examine two *martiyyas* ‘elegies’, from two of the main accounts written in Arabic describing the fall of Baghdad. The first is gleaned from Pseudo-Ibn al-Fuwaṭī’s *al-Ḥawādiṯ al-ġāmi‘a wa-l-taḡārib al-nāfi‘a fi l-mi‘a al-sāḥ‘ia* (‘The Comprehensive Events and Beneficial Trials in the Seventh Century’) The second is from al-Ḏahabī’s (d. 748 H./1347 e.C.) *Tārīḫ al-islām* (‘History of Islam’). First, a brief discussion concerning the authors, or, in the case of *al-Ḥawādiṯ*, an assumed author, is necessary. For, although Khalidi accepts the ascription of *al-Ḥawādiṯ* to Pseudo-Ibn al-
Fuwaṭī (Khalidi, 197), the Iraqi scholar Muḥammad Riḍa al-Ṣabībī showed that this is unlikely due to divergences in style and other discrepancies between it and Ibn al-Fuwatī’s main surviving work, Ṭalḥīṣ maqṣma ‘al-adāb. Rosenthal accepted Ṣabībī’s view (Maʿrīf, 9; Pseudo-Ibn al-Fuwatī, 9). Thus, as Rosenthal informs us in his article on Ibn al-Fuwatī, the actual author “was a contemporary or near-contemporary writer” (Rosenthal 1965).

The version of al-Hawādiḍ which we possess is one of the most contemporary accounts of the fall of Baghdad and may very-well have been written by someone who survived the events described therein considering the work’s limited chronological scope (beginning in 626 and ending in 700), its interest in specifically Iraqi affairs, as well as its familiarity with the events it describes. It contains a breadth of detail as well as reports of conversations and letters which presuppose a proximity to the events on the part of the author. The author tries to trace as well as to portray vividly the psychological backgrounds of the historical figures involved in the events of 656/1258 by employing an in medias res narrative approach in which there is a great deal of action but little explicit commentary by the author. Moreover, the intimate tone of the narrative suggests a heightened level of awareness, perhaps even personal, of the events related therein.

Al-Dahabī is a much clearer case. He is just as “known” and present in his text as the author of al-Hawādiḍ is unknown. A Damascene ‘ālim of the Šāfiʿī madhab, al-Dahabī was a respected religious scholar in his time. As teacher of ḥadīṯ at the Umm Ṣāliḥ madrasa in Damascus, he exercised considerable influence on the education of future scholars. So great was his prestige that he earned the title “muḥaddith al-‘asr” (traditionist of the age) and “ḥātim al-huffāz” (‘seal of the Qur’an reciters’) (De Somogyi & Bencheneb, 1965). De Somogyi and Bencheneb offer an assessment which tends to diminish the achievement of his most famous work, Tārīḥ al-islām, in relation to other historians. But nevertheless, they also acknowledge his history’s meticulous composition and attention to citation:

As an author he was not as prolific as Ibn al-Djawāzī before him or al-Suyūṭī after him; however, some of his works have attained a high standard […] his works are distinguished by careful composition and constant references to his authorities (De Somogyi & Bencheneb, 1965).

Tārīḥ al-islām6, as the title itself shows, is a monumental endeavor which attempts to offer a synthesis of Islamic history from Islam’s appearance on the historical stage up to the author’s own times, beginning in the first year of the Ḥiḍra and ending in year 700. It comprises ten ṭabaqāt (‘levels’ or ‘generations’) for each century, one for each decade, thereby yielding the symbolic number of 700 ṭabaqāt. Tārīḥ al-islām offers an annalistic history and is accompanied by a biographical dictionary of death dates, covering the history of notable Islamic figures in Iraq, Syria, Egypt and other locales.

The two accounts are exceptional in different ways, al-Hawādiḍ for its sparse intimacy and Tārīḥ al-islām for its highly developed structure. Both employ a similar chronological framework for relating the fall of Baghdad, despite key differences in their narrative tones. Both end their accounts with marṭiyyas for Baghdad and the ‘Abbāsids, which have a clear rhetorical function in both texts, as the poems serve the immediate purpose of offering what one might label a “poetic commentary” on 656/1258. Each account adheres to a specific set of intellectual commitments, and each explains the occurrences of 656/1258 with an eye to justifying its specific retelling of the event. For reasons of which

---

6 De Somogyi and Bencheneb write that al-Dahabī finished composing the manuscript in his own hand in 740/1339-40.
some are less obvious and some more (such as why Pseudo-Ibn al-Fuwatī did not gain a wide audience, even among the Shi‘a, whereas al-Ḍahabi‘î’s account would end up defining the development of many later Sunni traditions surrounding 656/1258), parts of both accounts left a deep influence on the description of the fall of Baghdad in 656/1258 in later Islamic historiography7. While the author of al-Ḥawādīṯ would be forgotten, aspects of his narrative, especially the marṭīyya which he cites, appear in later accounts right next to the marṭīyya cited in al-Ḍahabi‘î. This would ultimately lead to a synthesis between parts of the two poems while leaving the narratives within which they were originally cited at the sidelines, as lines from the two distinct poems, cited separately in Pseudo-Ibn al-Fuwatī and al-Ḍahabi‘î, are placed side by side in al-Suyūṭī, Ibn al-‘Īmād and al-Qaramānī. Thus, when comparing the marṭīyyas in their original context with their appearance in later historical texts, one discerns the genesis of a new tradition of citation through a welding together of two originally distinct traces of poetic citation.

In spite of this later tendency toward synthesis, as the historiographical tradition would slowly integrate disparate accounts into a cohesive narrative of the fall of Baghdad, these two accounts are quite dissimilar in their scope and language. Pseudo-Ibn al-Fuwatī’s version contains details that would no doubt undermine more propagandistic Sunni accounts of the fall of Baghdad. The concerns and stakes are almost diametrically opposed; the tone of al-Ḍahabi‘î’s narration of 656/1258 differs considerably from that of Pseudo-Ibn al-Fuwatī. The author of al-Ḥawādīṯ, though showing outward signs of being a recipient of Ilkhanid patronage, usually refrains from passing judgment in an overt manner. While sympathetic to the people of Baghdad, his language, use of titles, such as referring to Hulagu Khan as “Sultan” (Pseudo-Ibn al-Fuwatī, 359) or writing that Baghdad was “opened” (futihat), in addition to offering ʿalawat on the twelver Shi‘a imams (Pseudo-Ibn al-Fuwatī, 362), suggests that he was a Shi‘i, possibly a protégé of the Mongols and also close to the retinue of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī. At the same time, one cannot be too certain, since there are no instances of outright anti-Sunni rhetoric or signs of a deeper commitment to the Shi‘i cause other than a superficial identification with it. One could less likely suppose that the author was a compromised or lukewarm Sunni writing for a Shi‘i patron, as the narrative’s outward Shi‘i form nonetheless incorporates certain texts which are of doubtless Sunni provenance. For example, the marṭīyya quoted in al-Ḥawādīṯ on the fall of Baghdad is by a Šams al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī who is generally considered to be a Sunni and whose elegance makes clear use of Sunni references, as seen in his lament for the desolation of “The Abode of Guidance” (dār al-hidāyah) (Pseudo-Ibn al-Fuwatī, 363). Furthermore, there is little attempt on Pseudo-Ibn al-Fuwatī’s part to disguise either the Mongols’ disregard for Muslim mores or to brush over their brutality. For instance, the account for 656 ends with a description of Hulagu’s inviting the Nestorian Catholicos to reside in a palace belonging to an ‘Abbāsid official:

[Hulagu] invited the Ḥāṭalīq [Catholicos] to reside in the palace of ‘Alā al-Dīn al-Tibrīsī the great chamberlain, which was on the banks of the Tigris. The bell rang from its roof. He took possession of the Palace of the Star which had been reserved for the women and facing the aforementioned palace. He pulled down

7 Thus, whereas Ibn al-Taḡrībirdī (d. 874/1470) cites only Ibn Abū Yusr’s marṭīyya (which appears in al-Ḍahabi‘î in al-Nuḡūm al-zāhira, al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505), cites the two final verses attributed to Šams al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī in Pseudo-Ibn al-Fuwatī, without mentioning the author, in addition to Ibn Abū Yusr. Ibn al-‘Īmād (d. 1089/1679) also places them together in his Saḥarāt al-ṭahab, while, as al-Suyūṭī, not attributing the author of the lines in Pseudo-Ibn al-Fuwatī. Finally, al-Qaramānī (d. 1019/1610) in his Aḥbār al-dawal lists both while attributing the two lines found in Pseudo-Ibn al-Fuwatī to “Šams al-Dīn al-Wā‘iẓ al-Kūfī” (Ibn al-Taḡrībirdī, vol. 7: 51-52; Al-Suyūṭī, 748-750; Ibn al-‘Īmād, vol. 5: 271-272; Al-Qaramānī, 198-199).
the inscription which had been affixed to the two doors and had its replacement engraved in Syriac. [My translation. My emphasis. See unpublished Appendix.]

As seen here, for Pseudo-Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, the principal concern is to relate the political context and stream of events without providing religious explanations for the unfolding action or allocating blame among specific personalities. Thus, the underlying nuances in Pseudo-Ibn al-Fuwaṭī offer fertile ground for a reading more in line with Hodgson’s approach to historical texts as seen in his analysis of ʿUṯmān’s assassination in al-Ṭabarī.

There is the issue of style as well. Pseudo-Ibn al-Fuwaṭī narrates events in such a way as to permit the individual reader to come to their own conclusions, without necessarily exonerating his patrons or sparing his audience from macabre descriptions of the Mongols’ barbarism. On the other hand, al-Ḥāḥabī’s account seethes with innuendo. The treachery of certain parties, especially the Shi’a, who are consistently referred to as “Rāfīda,” and Shi’a personalities, who are identified as “rāfīds”, (Al-Ḥāḥabī, 44) is emphasized time and again. The portrayal of the principal historical figures involved in 656/1258 also differs markedly from the one in al-Ḥawādiṭ. There is less of an interest in describing the specific circumstances propelling their actions, questions of motivation or psychology, and less attention to the general plot. In a sense, al-Ḥāḥabī predetermines the events of 656/1258. Thus, though shorter than Pseudo-Ibn al-Fuwaṭī’s account, al-Ḥāḥabī’s version contains quite a bit of commentary; the account itself has its own subtitle in its entry for 656 entitled, rather obliquely, “Ka’īnāt Baḡdād” ‘The Event at Baghdad.’

On the other hand, unlike in Tārīḫ al-islām, the narrative of 656/1258 in al-Ḥawādiṭ occurs in a chapter entitled simply “656,” thereby situating the chronology of the fall of Baghdad in the context of the “flow of years”, the “passing of time,” which itself propels the narrative. In contrast, the account of the fall of Baghdad in Tārīḫ al-islām presents us with a break in the annalistic framework. Consequently, 656/1258 marks a rupture of sorts, a point of emphasis in history, which is intended to communicate deeper lessons for the benefit of the reader. Or, to paint this distinction with a broad brush, Pseudo-Ibn al-Fuwaṭī offers us a chronology of events in seventh/thirteenth century Iraq, whereas al-Ḥāḥabī relates events in terms of their relevance to the broader history of Islam by situating them in a universal Islamic framework.

The Texts of the marṭiyyas by Šams al-Dīn al-Kūfī and Ibn Abī Yusr

Commemorating the Fall of Bagdad:

Šams al-Dīn al-Kūfī, as cited in Pseudo-Ibn al-Fuwaṭī (my translation):

[1] بانوا ولي أدمع في الخَد ِّ تَشْتًبك
و لوعةٌ في مجال الصدر تَعتَرك

They have gone, as the tears on my cheek have become interlaced; / Passion in the field of the heart fights with itself.

[2] بالر غم لا بالرضا مني فراق هم
ساروا ولم أدر أي اللأرض قد سَلَكوا

In grief and not in joy (do I behold) their departure / They have left, and I do not know to what land they have travelled.

[3] يا صاحبي ما احتيالي كان بعدهم
أشِّرْ عليَّ فإنَّ الرأي مُشترك

O, my companion, after them, what recourse is left me? / Advise me, for decisions are shared.
The encounter (with them) becomes scarce, and, without it, my cunning is made narrow / So that the heart is troubled and confused in its matter.

What I have suffered holds back my desire/ Just as the snare holds back the wing from flight.

I desire patience, yet my heart does not obey me: / How can one rise when the knee betrays him?

If you lost a friend, then mourn for him with me, / For we are all sharing in this.

O calamity, not even one has escaped its unraveling / From among mortals: it has evened out slaves and kings.

With the passing of the glory, the hands of the enemy / Have taken our beloveds, thus they remained not, nor did they return.

If only what befell them could be redeemed I would redeem them / With my lifeblood and with all that I possess.

The Quarter of Guidance has become a void after their departure. / The blood of Islam is shed.

Where are the ones who ruled over all men? / Where are the ones who were ruled over, where those who ruled?

I halted by the palace after their departure asking it / About them and about what they had possessed.

The abandoned ruins and their empty courtyard responded: / “Yes, they were once here, but now they have perished.”

Do not count the tears flowing down my cheeks as water, / For they are the very spirit of youthful passion as it pours out.
And when he saw the dust of al-Ruṣāfā' and how the graves of the Caliphs had been disinterred and how those places had been razed, and how the earthly remains of men of grandeur had been made manifest in plain sight, he wrote on one of the walls:

إن تَرِّد عِّبْرَة فتلك بنو العب
و قالت الشعراء قصائض في مراثي بغداد و أهلوها و تمثل بقول سبط التعاويذي
و لتقي الدين إسماعيل بن أبي اليسر
و لما شاهد ترب الرصافة و قد نبشت قبور الخلفاء و أحرقت تلكا الأماكن، و أبرزت العظام و الرؤوس كتب على بعض الحيطان:

If a sign appears, then this is the Banū l-‘Abbās / Who were visited by destruction.

The harems have been plundered when the living / from among them were killed and the dead burnt.

He also said then:

O League of Islam, mourn and lament / With sighs of grief for what befell al-Must‘āṣim

Before his time, the vizierate belonged to Ibn al-Furāt / But now it has passed to Ibn al-‘Alqamī.

Ibn Abī Yusr, as cited in al-Ḏahabī (my translation)

Their houses have been effaced along with their people; / By the remaining of our lord the vizier there is ruin.

To one whose tears flow there are tidings from Baghdad: / Why do you remain when the lovers have departed?

O pilgrims on your way to al-Zawra‘, do not come forth: / There is no refuge there; the abode has turned to many abodes.

The crown of the caliphate and the quarter by which the city’s landmarks were ennobled / Have been effaced by desolation.
At dawn a trace of the destruction’s surge shows upon the quarter; / The tears upon the traces leave traces.

O the fire of my heart is aflame from the roaring fire of the warring / Which blazed upon the quarter before delivering it to the whirlwind.

The cross hangs highest upon the city’s minbars; / Those whom the girdle once confined have taken power.

How many harems has the Turk captured by force / Even though behind the veil there were many veils.

How many full moons were eclipsed at al-Badriyya / From the moons of the hamlet there shall loom no more shining.

How many treasures were found scattered that day / As the infidels seized them through pillage.

How many punishments did their swords inflict upon the people’s necks / Thus unburdening them of their sins.

I wailed as the defiled prisoners were dragged through the streets / To the slaughter by enemies who filled them with terror.

Then herded like cattle to the death which they beheld: / The Fire, o my Lord, before this shame!

God knows that the people were made heedless / By the exceeding bounties in which they delighted,

But when heedless, they forgot the portion of the Almighty, / And so a mighty oppressor from the armies of unbelief fell upon them.

O for men there are warnings and justifications / In what is told to us concerning calamities.
To gain a fuller understanding of the significance of these poems, it would be necessary to offer a close reading of each line. Due to limits in length, this is not possible in the current article. But one major difference is readily apparent in the two poems, and this perhaps sheds light on the concerns and commitments of our two historians, Pseudo-Ibn al-Fuwatī and al-Ḍahabī, as well as the two poets whom they cite.

On the one hand, in ʿṢams al-Dīn al-Kūfī’s ʿmārjiyya, we see a gradual progression from personal mourning to a reflection on the universal significance of the fall of Baghdad. On the other hand, in Ibn Abī Yusr’s ʿmārjiyya, the mourning for Baghdad begins with a scene of individual lament before delving into the universal motifs that preoccupy the majority of the poem, before finally recapitulating a more personal tone in the last line. This differs markedly from the development of the ʿmārjiyya by ʿṢams al-Dīn al-Kūfī. The final orientation of Ibn Abī Yusr’s ʿmārjiyya is also at odds with the general resonance of al-Ḍahabī’s account, in which the historian sets his narrative in a religious context quite unlike that of the first person account in Pseudo-Ibn al-Fuwatī’s history. The inevitable question arises: what is the reason for this juxtaposition in orientation, specifically between the poems themselves and the historical accounts in which they are cited? Moreover, to what degree were our two historians who quoted these very distinct poems “conscious” of this difference when citing them in their histories? And what about later historians who cited the same two poems?

This paper argues that a close analysis of the narratives and the poems reveals that the discontinuity between the trends within the poems and the broader narratives are not accidental. Rather, they provide an insight into the rhetorical turns and choices underpinning the specific accounts of the fall of Baghdad in Pseudo-Ibn al-Fuwaṭī and al-Ḍahabī.
In both cases, the poems complement and augment the quality of the prose narrative, resulting in a larger textual unit comprising both prose and poetry. In Pseudo-Ibn al-Fuwatī, the personal nature of the *martiyya* by Ṣāms al-Dīn al-Kūfī, which is reiterated in the beginning and middle of the poem, acquires a universal relevance in the last lines, in which the fall of Baghdad, apart from the personal mourning which it evokes, offers a lesson in political wisdom. Thus, it adds a broader dimension to the account by ending with an emphasis on the cyclical nature of history, especially the rise and fall of dynasties and the formation of a *dawla* qua state. On the other hand, in al-Ḍahabī, Ibn Abī Yusr’s *martiyya* narrows the universal scope of the narrative by relating the events at Baghdad through the suitably “orthodox” gaze of a Damascene Sunni scholar. Here, the universal dimension of the fall of Baghdad is personalized. However, this emphasis on the personal serves a didactic purpose, as the poet instructs us to understand the religious significance of the fall of Baghdad in order to impart the full consequences of sin and arrogance in an Islamic worldview, specifically un-Islamic conduct on the part of corrupt rulers, who invite God’s wrath upon themselves and their subjects through their sinfulness and disobedience.

Here, the Mongols serve as instruments of divine wrath, which is visited upon the ʿAbbāsids and the “arrogant” people of Baghdad. Nevertheless, despite the poet’s grief, with which his audience is meant to identify, people must go on with their lives, albeit with a certain amount of uncertainty, and accept the fact that they, like the poet, are fated to outlive the ʿAbbāsids. Here, a historical event serves as a lesson for the present which, through its personalization at the beginning and end of the poem, allows us to understand this event’s general significance on a more intimate plane. Additionally, one may consider Khalidi’s identification of “epistemic domes” in classical Arabic historiography. While such a labeling is not the goal of this paper, one might nevertheless consider the category of “history as ḥadīṯ” in relation to al-Ḍahabī, whereas Pseudo-Ibn al-Fuwatī would fall under the categories of *hikma* and *siyāsa* (Khalidi, 232).

**Conclusion**

The principal impetus behind this paper is to consider ways of understanding poetry in classical Arabic historical texts. As stated in the introduction, this paper questions the applicability of modern notions of bifurcation of genre vis-à-vis poetry and prose in Arabic historiography. Why, one may ask, would our contemporary “disciplinary” and genre-based understanding of “poetry” versus “history,” which, *pace* Rosenthal, places a premium on the latter, with its implicit hierarchy of “value,” also be appropriate to reading classical Arabic texts?

A recent volume on the subject reveals that this thorny issue is still relevant. In 2011 Baalbaki, Agha & Khalidi published a volume of essays by distinguished scholars in the field of classical Arabic literature and history dedicated to probing the place of poetry in Arabic historiography. The resulting volume bears the title *Poetry and History: the Value of Poetry in Reconstructing Arab History* (Baalbaki et alii). As seen in the very title of the volume, the question of “value” remains, as if to suggest that the relationship between poetry and history lies in assessing the “value” of the former for determining the significance of the latter. Such an approach would tend to place historical data above rhetoric, aesthetics and ethics, both of which were of exceptional importance for classical Islamic authors, as shown in El-Hibri’s work.

Moreover, what is being “reconstructed” here, and how can poetry help “reconstruct” something from which it is already *a priori* excluded, namely “history,” thereby inevitably placing “poetry” on a secondary if not tertiary level? The student of classical Arabic literature and committed “anti-historicist-reductionist,” as opposed to the
historian, might imagine a slightly different title, something like: “History and Poetry: The Value of History for Understanding Classical Arabic Poetry”.

The question of historical value as conceived in this narrow sense is in itself slightly problematic and calls to mind a type of reductive historicism which Nietzsche criticizes in his essay on modern historiography in the Untimely Meditations entitled “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,” originally published in 1874. An examination of Nietzsche’s critique shows that the very notion of locating “value” in history is very much a relic of 19th century historical thought, whereas locating “value” in poetry for “reconstructing history” marks a further narrowing-down of this trend (Stetkevych, 21, 40). One of the chief flaws which Nietzsche finds in 19th century historiography lies in its fragmentation through specialization, which sets it apart from “history” as the pre-moderns understood it. Thus, according to Nietzsche, the moderns are lost and left floating in a sea of detail and therefore are unable to grasp the synthesis which was all too apparent to their predecessors. (One notices this in the way in which Rosenthal and others set poetry and history side by side in a hierarchy completely alien to classical Islamic thought.) Given such trends, aspects of Nietzsche’s critique could still be said to apply to certain areas in the field of classical Islamic studies, especially those dealing with literature. For such trends, as Jaroslav Stetkevych writes in a recent essay, are still in many respects products of the discourse of 19th century European historical philologism, or else to that epistemic mode which Edward Said famously identifies with “Orientalism.” Nietzsche was critical of such trends in late 19th century European historicism:

Let us now picture the spiritual occurrence introduced into the soul of modern man by that which we have just described. Historical knowledge streams in unceasingly from inexhaustible wells, the strange and incoherent forces its way forward, memory opens all its gates and yet is not open wide enough, nature travails in an effort to receive, arrange and honour these strange guests, but they themselves are in conflict with one another and it seems necessary to constrain and control them if one is not oneself to perish in their conflict […] In the end, modern man drags around with him a huge quantity of indigestible stones of knowledge, which then, as in the fairy tale, can sometimes be heard rumbling about inside him. And in this rumbling there is betrayed the most characteristic quality of modern man: the remarkable antithesis between an interior which fails to correspond to any exterior and an exterior which fails to correspond to any interior –an antithesis unknown to the peoples of earlier times. Knowledge, consumed for the greater part without hunger for it […] remains concealed within a chaotic inner world which modern man describes with a curious pride as his uniquely characteristic ‘subjectivity’ (Nietzsche, 78).

But Nietzsche finds the solution to this modern appreciation of the “historical” in the suprahistorical, a category which calls to mind Aristotle’s definition of poetry and history in the Poetics:

I call ‘suprahistorical’ the powers which lead the eye away from becoming towards that which bestows upon existence the character of the eternal and stable, towards art and religion. Science –for it is science which would here speak of poisons –sees in these two forces hostile forces: for science considers the only right and true way of regarding things, that is to say the only scientific way, as being that which sees everywhere things that have been, things historical, and nowhere things that are, things eternal (Nietzsche, 120).
For Nietzsche, the “unhistorical” and “suprahistorical” were a means of escaping the “historically” saturated present of late 19th century Germany. Thus, Nietzsche idealizes the ancient Greeks as an example of this “unhistorical” model:

[The Greeks] during the period of their greatest strength kept a tenacious hold on their unhistorical sense; if a present-day man were magically transported back to that world he would probably consider the Greeks very ‘uncultured’ (Nietzsche, 79).

Nietzsche’s conclusions in his famous essay informed his criticism of historical thought in Germany. But, despite their “timeliness,” the student of classical Arabic literature may still benefit from one of Nietzsche’s main insights: the existence of distinct modes of historical perception. In looking at the texts studied in this paper, especially the poems, one would sooner locate them in the category of the “suprahistorical,” or of poetry in the sense in which Aristotle defines “poetry” in Book IX of the Poetics, instead of relegating these poems to the category of the “historical” as found in 19th century European historicism, in the sense that Nietzsche defines the term.

To a certain extent, both histories of the fall of Baghdad examined in this paper, especially as seen in the two marṭiyūs, emphasize “universals” in the Aristotelian sense, as well as how these “universals” relate to individual events, rather than focusing on the “particulars” consisting of mere fragments of data. In this regard, the cohesion of the narrative is more important than the details that comprise the narrative: the way in which the facts are arranged overshadows the significance of the specific facts in relation to their narration.

The poet describes the fall of Baghdad not as it “has been” but as it “is” and as it always “is” in the mind of the poet. A failure to appreciate this aspect of the poems and the way in which the feeling for the present illuminates the poems’ composition will result in a failure to understand not only the poems themselves but the very texts in which these poems are cited. This goes beyond a specific case though. An inability to read classical Arabic poetry within its full context will inevitably result in a lack of comprehension regarding the place of poetry in classical Arabic historical texts, as well as in a lack of appreciation of the real import of these texts and the poems cited in them.

Setting Nietzsche’s conclusions to the side, we would do well to turn to Collingwood. For our purposes, Collingwood’s contribution lies in positing a category beyond “historical consciousness” per se, namely, that of “historical imagination.” In speaking of the historian’s attempt at approaching his subject, Collingwood narrows the scope of his endeavor:

The historian’s picture, like that of the novelist, is a picture displayed by the imagination to the imagination. The historian’s world, the world of past events, is a world absolutely closed to perception; no part of it can in any circumstances be perceived by him, nor can his beliefs about it in any circumstances be verified by his perception […] But although he cannot perceive it, or remember it, or in the scientific sense think it, he can and does imagine it, and this is all he can do. Not only is it by imagining them that he interpolates additional facts in between the fixed points supplied by his authorities; it is also by imagining them that he envisages the facts recorded by those authorities themselves, or the facts which, again by the use of his imagination, he finds that his authorities have concealed or did not know. Thus the critical work of the historian, as well as his interpolative work, is done in and by his imagination (Collingwood, 162).
Collingwood’s insistence on the imagination as the principal mental faculty of history shows how the very attempt of thinking historically is deeply subjective. Moreover, for Collingwood, to compose history is to find meaning in history: “the course of history is self-determining; and therefore the historian’s picture of it must be self-explanatory in the same sense in which the novelist’s picture of his subject is self-explanatory” (Collingwood, 163). Contemporary trends in the philosophy of history have certainly strayed far from Collingwood’s day, as our post-modern context questions the very existence of the text as text. However, for classical Islamic history, Collingwood’s theory of the historical imagination may be promising.

As seen in the *marṭīyyas* studied in this paper and the historical narratives in which they are cited, the principal concern of the two poets, Šams al-Dīn al-Kūfī and Ibn Abī Yusr, and of the two historians who cite them, Pseudo-Ibn al-Fuwaṭī and al-Ḏahabī, is to interpret a historical event of great magnitude, the fall of Baghdad, in relation to religious, ethical, political and aesthetic concerns. To focus strictly on the empirical aspect, as Rosenthal and purist historicists would have it, is to miss the point. Only by trying to understand “how” the historians and poets thought about history in specific examples and especially in pondering the inconsistencies in specific texts can one come to a deeper understanding of the problems with which their historiography contended, as well as of the loyalties and intellectual commitments that characterized their time. By tracing the development of the “historical imagination” as it unfolds on an aesthetic plane, a close reading of classical Arabic poetry in historical works also shows how classical Islamic history was composed and thus how it became “historiography,” with all of the theoretical implications that the term “historiography” implies in the totality of its existence as a self-conscious intellectual discipline rather than a mere collection of facts.
Works Cited

Sources

Secondary Bibliography

ISSN 1540 5877 eHumanista/IVITRA 13 (2018): 277-295


