“Salido a la vergüenza”:
Inquisition, Penalty, and a Cervantine View of Mediterranean ‘Values’

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The seventh of November, 1604 was to have been a memorable day for the residents of Triana, an arrabal along the banks of the Guadalquivir which had hosted the headquarters of the Spanish Inquisition since the year 1481. Preparations for an auto de fe scheduled for that day were nearly complete, and, on the eve of the infamous act’s celebration, throngs of ardent spectators filled the streets to witness the procession of the Green Cross, all while the prisoners awaited their fate in the town’s castle. As Fernando de Acevedo—a canon, inquisitor, and statesman for King Philip III—described the scene, “estaba todo el arsenal [sic, arenal] de Sevilla y Triana y el castillo lleno de gente, y que eran las once de la noche, y todos esperando a la mañana, para ver salir los presos al auto, y la Cruz puesta en el cadahalso, y doce religiosos velándola” (109). And then, around the same time that night, an urgent royal decree was received to suspend the auto de fe: “Cuando está Sevilla y toda su comarca esperando la celebración del auto, oyen la voz de un pregonero diciendo que por justos respetos se suspendió y luego comenzó un sentimiento grande en todos, una tristeza interior como si cada uno fuera el agravado… conocióse en este sentimiento y suceso el amor y respeto junto con temor que a la Inquisición se tiene” (Acevedo 108). As the most visible face of the Inquisition’s varied activities, the public auto de fe general capitalized on its increasingly theatrical qualities as a Baroque spectacle to become a potent force in the imagination of the Spanish populace, a source of public fervor as well as a repository into which it was strategically channeled. But Acevedo’s account also poignantly illustrates the range and intensity of the emotions that such a spectacle (or, in this case, its last-minute cancellation) could stir in its attendees, from a general feeling of affliction and internal sadness to seemingly contradictory sentiments of love, respect, and fear. The observation that each jilted bystander felt as though he or she were the “agradado”, by internalizing the feeling of offense typically reserved for the accused, suggests at least two more: honor and shame, concepts which have been identified as largely accounting for the general effectiveness of inquisitorial practice in the early modern Mediterranean.

Although the aggrandizing or propagandistic identification of ‘love’ and ‘respect’ for the Inquisition in Acevedo’s description would likely contrast rather starkly with the affective associations of many everyday citizens with the institution, this disparity alerts us to the rhetorical, discursive, and performative praxis of inquisitorial attempts to appropriate and exploit certain collective emotions toward politico-religious ends. In Pierre Bourdieu’s terms, honor and shame thus constituted an emotional “habitus” that structured social and political practices, actuated through a kind of recursive function or feedback loop in which the affective content of lived experience was absorbed and instrumentalized by an institution such as the Inquisition only to percolate back down to inform the feelings of everyday life. This phenomenon is perhaps most clear in the morphological distinction between shame as a noun (the feeling of being ashamed) and...
and shame as a verb (the action of shaming), one which will form a principle line of analysis in the present essay. Literature and other forms of cultural production intervene in this tension as well, and Cervantes’s writing, in particular, demonstrates a marked interest in exploring the affective valences that inevitably attend historical practices, even one at first glance as cold and calculated as the inquisitional auto de fe. While a more or less explicit representation of an auto de fe in Don Quijote has long been recognized by critics (Sancho’s parodic trial in the duke and duchess’s castle [II, 69, 1294-1301]), I identify a similarly inquisitorial discourse in the principle character’s encangment throughout the final chapters of the 1605 novel (I, 46-52). Until now, the critical attention paid to Don Quijote’s enjaulamiento has chiefly focused on either its historical use as a treatment for madness or its precedents in the romances of chivalry. Without discounting these intertextual parallels, my close reading of these chapters uncovers a potentially more subversive influence: that of early modern methods of dealing with criminality, and especially those informed by inquisitorial and popular practices of public shaming. As far as I am aware, this particular element has yet to be recognized as an historical undertone of Don Quijote’s encangment. Beyond recovering an alternative historical context for these episodes, my purpose here will be to suggest how, by attending closely to the characterological manifestations of an emotion like shame, we stand to gain a more nuanced— if ultimately less unified—view of the ways in which it was expressed, manipulated, transformed, and exchanged in what we might echo Fernand Braudel by calling the affective economy of the early modern Mediterranean. My consideration of the heuristic possibilites opened by shame will allow me to conclude by gesturing towards an ethical reevalution of its role in the constitution of supposed Mediterranean ‘values’, a role which stands to challenge dominant structures of power through an affirmation of defeat and to prescribe an ethics which dwells at the intersection of personal virtue and political, non-violent dissent. First, however, it will be necessary to situate my analysis against the multidisciplinary backdrop of the ongoing and often polemical debates surrounding honor and shame in the Mediterranean.

Rooted in Roman Catholic doctrine and practiced in Spain, Portugal, France, Italy, and the Papal States, the Christian Inquisition—despite its more limited practice in other parts of Europe and later expansion to some Asian and American colonies—was a decidedly Mediterranean phenomenon. The inquisitor’s manuals, instrucciones, and cartas acordadas that governed inquisitional practice were often circulated and reprinted across the Mediterranean and thus formed part of its dynamic networks of exchange. Likewise, honor and shame have long been identified—to employ the terminology of mid-twentieth-century anthropology—as the ‘values’ of Mediterranean society. In Cervantes’s works, shame—as well as emotion(s) more broadly—is often framed by historical structures which were at once common to a significant part of the Mediterranean context at large—such as the Inquisition—as well as locally developed along cultural, regional, national, and imperial lines. By focusing on these structures or shame’s enabling conditions, a more complete mapping of these lines stands to be drawn, in addition to the networks, nodes, and flows between them. This approach is consistent with the Braudelian view of the Mediterranean as a space both incapable of being grasped independently of that which lies outside of it and one which is undermined by an artificial adherence to rigid boundaries. The very nature of shame is such that it may be provoked precisely by a transgression of these boundaries, simultaneously calling our attention to their existence while highlighting the fluidity, dynamism, and interdependence of cultural contact zones. In short, the geographical unity of the Mediterranean should not be taken as a priori evidence of emotional
uniformity. My analysis, therefore, supposes two complementary yet divergent conceptual maneuvers: on the one hand, forestalling the reification of a homogenous or monolithic ‘Mediterranean(ism)’, and, on the other, demystifying the honor-shame binary by recovering the real, material, or corporal conditions of the latter. And yet it is not clear that Braudel’s model is the most appropriate for such a task, especially in light of its harsh criticism by Cervantism’s own Américo Castro, who accused the father of longue durée Mediterranean historiography of subsuming the particularities of Spanish everyday life to a grand economic system and thus neglecting both “el sentir de la gente” and the racial politics of blood purity between Christians, Jews, and Muslims in which such feelings were often embedded (1976, xx-xxi). In seeking to foreground these elements within a Mediterranean framework, this essay implicitly places these two contradictory figures—Braudel and Castro—into conversation with one another. By purposefully withholding any attempt at resolving these contradictions, it is my intention to plot some of the shared profits and perils that arise when considering two emerging fields—affect theory and Mediterranean studies—within the context of cervantismo, even if by anchoring my analysis in a case study of shame punishments a third possible paradigm suggests itself: that which Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell, in the first large-scale work of Mediterranean historiography since Braudel’s volume, have called Mediterranean “microecologies” (464-465).

**Anthropologies of Mediterranean Honor and Shame**

In addition to a direct response to Braudel, the coining of this term is an attempt by Horden and Purcell to account for the place of honor and shame, which “might suitably be interpreted as the values of Mediterranean microecologies” (518). Indeed, an overt assumption that honor and shame are simply counterparts of the same cultural phenomenon has tended to color many anthropological studies of these Mediterranean ‘values’. In the introduction to *Honour and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society*, for example, J. G. Peristiany discusses honor and shame as merely “two poles of an evaluation” (9). Such a conflation is perhaps partly responsible for the disproportionate level of critical attention that has been granted to honor over its complementary “pole”. Castro has written extensively on the importance of honor in Cervantes’s works, and it was no less omnipresent, so the story goes, as a social phenomenon: it was the linchpin in relations between caballeros, the sine qua non of female worth, the watchword of early modern Spanish society at large. Bartolomé Bennassar even went so far as to claim that “If there was one passion capable of defining the conduct of the Spanish people, it was the passion of honor” (213).² Shame, on the other hand—perhaps due to its own will to concealment—is not equally visible, neither in the primary texts themselves nor in works of early modern historiography and textual criticism. As I hope will become clear, however, the affect of shame is not only distinct from honor and a meaningful object of study sui generis but is also present as a crucial narrative feature in *Don Quijote*, even if not as immediately discernible as honor. Modern psychologists and personality theorists such as Silvan Tomkins, whose work on shame was responsible for inspiring several later publications in the field of cultural studies, have identified a number of other contrasting emotions for shame and placed them on “axes” that correspond to the affect’s polyvalent attachments, such as shame-pride, shame-humiliation, shame-guilt, shame-fear, and shame-rage. The extended idea in classical,

² The nearly ubiquitous presence of honor in the *comedia* has also been studied at length by scholars such as Arellano, Caro Baroja (1992), Castro (1956; 1976), García Valdecasas, Larson, McKendrick, Pitt-Rivers, and Taylor, among others. For a more extensive bibliography, see Artiles.
medieval, and early modern thought that shame could serve a positive function as a marker of virtue—in effect, as a quality seen as honorable—further serves to deconstruct a facile honor-shame dichotomy. By remarking on these complexities, what I wish to underscore is not that shame was entirely independent of the ‘honor code’ that has often been taken for granted as a fundamental characteristic of Mediterranean societies, but rather that shame often functions in modes quite different from honor and which would remain overlooked by a strict adherence to such traditional generalizations. The picaresque novel, a genre for which we might identify yet another axis for shame—shamelessness—rather conspicuously attests to this reality: although honor tended to be reserved for a relatively small sector of society, shame was available to all, even if the very idea of the picaresque is borne by the figure of the sinvergüenza.

It bears recalling that honor and shame have often been entangled in the kinds of stereotypical or unquestioned essentialisms that sought to relegate Mediterranean cultures to a more irrational and uncivilized status than that of their northern European counterparts, a phenomenon not unrelated to the imperial and ideological interests behind the Black Legend (which was partly fuelled by Spain’s association with the Inquisition). But these gestures have influenced a vein of Spanish literary criticism since the nineteenth century as well: on the one hand, ethnocentric attempts to dismiss southern European cultures as hopelessly impassioned, violent, and obsessed with honor; and on the other, their no less vocal defenders, who sought to elevate the supposedly exceptional valuation of personal honor as a Spanish national virtue—to claim honor itself as a badge of honor, as it were. What this suggests is that with honor we are dealing not so much with the affective reality or feelings of a discrete epoch as with a discourse, one with a lengthy trajectory in various spheres of Mediterranean culture, historiography, and the popular imaginary. By this I do not mean to imply that seventeenth-century everyday life was devoid of honor or that the Spaniard, noble or otherwise, did not feel honor. On the contrary, its extreme popularity in the comedia stands as singular proof of the fact, as Scott K. Taylor’s albeit skeptical study of the Iberian ‘honor code’ concedes, that “honor gripped the imaginations of early modern Castilians themselves” (5). It is clear, rather, that the proliferation of discourses of and about honor has exceeded the enabling conditions that accompanied its emergence; the signifier has largely eclipsed the signified, not to mention its oft-polarized counterpart of shame.

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3 The most comprehensive critique of the overstated importance of honor in Golden Age society is to be found in Taylor, who advocates instead for a “rhetoric of honor” by undermining the rigidity of the ‘honor code’ through an extensive examination of seventeenth-century criminal justice proceedings. The fallacy and limitations of the honor-shame binary are also underscored by Wikan (635-636); and Kressel and Arioti.

4 These unique complexities of shame also inhere in the semantic registers of the word itself, for which a word of caution is in order regarding the problem of translation. As Yakov Malkiel has noted, the term vergüenza may connote myriad English-language concepts, from “reserve” and “embarrassment” to “bashfulness” and “esteem”, among others (514). On the other hand, the idea of shame is expressed by an equally long list of other sixteenth- and seventeenth-century words such as acato, afrentarse, confusión, correrse, cortedad, deshonra, desprecio, empacho, encogimiento, infamia, pudor, rubor, and sonrojo. While the proliferation of such terms attests to the mutual influence between language and affect and highlights the abiding complexity of their mediation by Spanish culture, it is clear that the English word “shame” remains inadequate for expressing these nuances. In order to mitigate the risk of neutralizing such complexities, I attempt whenever practical to contextualize my analysis with original usage and reference to both Covarrubias and the narrative circumstances of the emotion’s emergence.

5 Castro and Ramón Menéndez Pidal, in particular, endeavored to trace the concept of a uniquely Spanish sense of honor back to a plethora of possible historical and literary sources: from the epic (Menéndez Pidal 365) to the Italian drama (Castro 1956, 329) as well as the casuists (350-354), Arabs, Goths, romances of chivalry, and, quite simply, Spanish national character (324). Other possible origins are pondered in Horden and Purcell (515-519).
It could be argued, of course, that shame is just as discursive a phenomenon as honor; in effect, the discourse of shame is what to a great extent enables its force as a tool of coercion, politico-religious power, and punishment, as I hope to demonstrate in the following analysis. But in pointing out shame’s visual, material, physiognomic, or bodily qualities, I hope to establish that such characteristics are distinctive not only of the affect itself but of Cervantes’s art of the novel as well.

These examples, furthermore, alert us to the care that must be taken whenever attempting to ascribe certain emotional characteristics or moral values to any collective social group, and even more so when that group encompasses a geographical and cultural area as vast and diverse as the Mediterranean. The publication of Peristiany’s volume marked an important advancement in sociology and cultural anthropology and, specifically, in building an anthropological framework for a comparative understanding of Mediterranean emotions. While conceding that honor and shame were present to some degree in all societies and attempting to qualify their conclusions by focusing on discrete ethnographic contexts within the Mediterranean, Honour and Shame served as the touchstone for a disciplinary and ideological debate among anthropologists in the following decades.6 This debate was led by Michael Herzfeld, who echoes the acute linguistic limitations I described above in order to sound a warning bell regarding the ethical stakes of an honor/shame-based Mediterranean and its inherent danger of giving “the impression that the objective of anthropological analysis is to generalize about the cultural characteristics of particular regions, rather than to synthesize the results of a far more intensely localized form of ethnography into a globally effective portrait of humankind”. Even more alarmingly, he adds that ‘Mediterraneanism’ “thus becomes one of several means whereby anthropology risks aiding and abetting the perpetuations of cultural stereotypes” (1984, 439). Notwithstanding such concerns, recent interdisciplinary developments of the so-called ‘affective turn’ stand as a compelling invitation to reopen the debate regarding these emotions of such ostensibly fundamental importance to the early modern Mediterranean—especially shame, whose social, cultural, and literary value has been relegated to the dialectic shadow of honor far too long.

And yet I hasten to add that as literary scholars we must take similar care not to fall prey to the pitfalls of Mediterraneanism confronted by cultural anthropologists in the latter half of the twentieth century. Although temporal and objective distance may dampen the impact of such questions (i.e. the study of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century cultural production as opposed to ethnographies of living populations), it should not blunt the precision and historical accuracy with which we engage our texts. We must also remain mindful of these lessons from anthropology in order to avoid perpetuating generalizations, reducing complexities, or reproducing essentialisms—for example that of a putative early modern Spanish ‘honor society’. This task is now even more imperative given the current and rapidly growing interest among humanities and social science fields in ‘Mediterranean Studies’. To be sure, these pitfalls are further magnified in the psychological realm: due predominately to the lack of a universal critical vocabulary for classifying and analyzing emotions, an oversimplification of Mediterranean

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6 Regarding the debate among anthropologists, see especially Herzfeld (1980; 1984; 1985); and Galt, who carried out an exchange of mutual criticism in the journal American Ethnologist in the mid-eighties that centered largely on the honor-shame question in Mediterranean cultures. Boissevain; Davis; and Horden and Purcell (485-523; 637-641) are also important for contextualizing the more general polemic of Mediterraneanism among anthropologists and ethnographers since the publication of Peristiany’s volume.
affectivity is nearly unavoidable. In the midst of these numerous cautionary cases and caveats, however, an affect like shame, when contextualized within discrete historical practices and social structures, offers considerable purchase for understanding how various forms of cultural production intervened in the construction of a distinctly Mediterranean affective economy, as well as for disentangling the more localized threads of everyday emotional experience which were gradually interwoven across this dynamic space to form the complex, knotted tapestry of values, valorizations, and reevaluations that confront cultural historians and literary scholars of the Mediterranean basin today.

**Don Quijote’s Blush; or, the Syntax of Shameful Chivalry**

Scholars of cultural studies and other literary traditions have recently emphasized that shame is not merely an emotion to be repressed, overcome, or, indeed, ashamed of, but that it is attached in an affirmative way to what Tomkins called “interest”. Eve Sedgwick and Adam Frank, highly influenced by Tomkins, explain that “the pulsations of cathexis around shame [...] are what either enable or disenable so basic a function as the ability to be interested in the world” (97). In other words, shame surfaces only when the subject is sufficiently invested in an object, idea, or ideology (such as knight errantry) so as to enable such a feeling when these interests face a barrier to their realization (such as Don Quijote’s failures). Shame thus has the potential to “[highlight] unknown or unappreciated investments,” to indicate where these interests lie even when they are not self-evident (Probyn 14). These interests or investments roughly correspond to what I have already referred to as shame’s enabling conditions, or the cultural, historical, and aesthetic factors which, to one degree or another, inevitably attend its expression in Cervantes’s works. Fictional narrative can therefore be a powerful tool for exploring shame as a lived experience, for uncovering the “unknown”, “unappreciated” or poorly understood regarding these factors; likewise, the vital, lived experience of shame offers an equally potent means to reflect upon Cervantes’s writing. In *Don Quijote*, Cervantes developed a psychologically complex character capable of self-reflection, inner doubt, and emotional dynamism, qualities informed not only by the poetic conventions of the novel, but also by Cervantes’s keen awareness of the historical and political landscape of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Mediterranean. Don Quijote’s evolution throughout the novel is thus informed by the affective binds produced in the tension between, on the one hand, the heroic impulse of his chivalric ethos and, on the other, the increasing social demands of modernity, the rise of the state, the development of modern practices of warfare and military professionalism, and popular and inquisitorial forms of punishment. As an affect which is culturally inflected (that is to say, shame was felt in the seventeenth century for different reasons than today), shame alerts us to this tension as, like the blush on Don Quijote’s face, a kind of red flag indicating the various anxieties behind its emergence.

According to Tomkins, the “innate activator of shame is the incomplete reduction of interest or joy. Hence any barrier to further exploration which partially reduces interest… will activate the lowering of the head and eyes in shame and reduce further exploration or self-exposure” (1963, 23; see also Tomkins 1995). Along with the blush, these physiognomic and visual registers of shame often play a crucial role in signaling shameful moments in the novel, beginning with Don Quijote’s very first discursive exchange as a knight errant, when he mistakes the two prostitutes for maidens and is left ashamed by their laughter: “Como se oyeron llamar doncellas, cosa tan fuera de su profesión, no pudieron tener la risa y fue de manera que don
Quijote vino a correrse” (I, 2, 53). Later, when he discovers that the sounds of thunderous pounding in the night are not a sinister threat but an occurrence that is, so to speak, much more run-of-the-mill—fulling hammers—he produces a similar reaction: “Cuando don Quijote vio lo que era, enmudeció y pasmose de arriba abajo. Mirole Sancho y vio que tenía la cabeza inclinada sobre el pecho, con muestras de estar corrido” (I, 20: 239). In general, Cervantes’s characters are remarkably adept at reading the emotional states of one another by observing behaviors, demeanors, gestures, and facial expressions, and here Sancho immediately intuits that Don Quijote has become ashamed. But the typically involuntary nature and visible signs of shame, in particular, facilitate such immediate recognition by other characters and readers alike, the blush of the face and lowering of the head serving as semiotic features which lend shame a narrative role that functions quite differently from that of honor’s (see Figure 1). A similar emotional exchange occurs several chapters later with the priest and barber’s fabricated story of their assault by a gang of galley slaves, leaving Don Quijote blushing in grim silence: “Se le mudaba la color a cada palabra, y no osaba decir que él había sido el libertador de aquella buena gente” (I, 29: 377). Soon thereafter, he is once again shamed in front of his friends when the young Andrés, prodded by the proud knight to corroborate the story of his heroic confrontation of Juan Haldado, reveals that Don Quijote only served to aggravate his cruel master’s abuse: “Quedó corridísimo don Quijote del cuento de Andrés, y fue menester que los demás tuviesen mucha cuenta con no reírse, por no acaballe de correr del todo” (I, 31: 402).

If we think about the great quantity of episodes of secondary narration or those in which an intradiegetic audience is present in the novel, it becomes clear that the protagonist will frequently be subject to this kind of situation and conscious of his actions before a similar public. As readers, of course, we are invited to share in the humor and incipient schadenfreude toward Don Quijote that such infelicities and failures produce in the text, a tone which is, moreover, characteristic of a large part of the novel as a whole. On the other hand, these examples (just a few of many) offer the subjective possibility of empathy through an identification with Don Quijote’s suffering of shame, suggesting we temper our laughter just as his friends did in their sympathetic attempt at mitigating his emotional discomfort (“por no acaballe de correr del todo”). Yet beyond their unique capacity to induce both parody and pathos—and, therefore, to trouble the oft-exaggerated distinction between the ‘Romantic’ and ‘hard’ critical approaches to the novel—these shameful moments point to an ethical reflection on the part of Don Quijote, who recognizes that his actions have not achieved the desired results but, in reality, have

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7 Covarrubias’s definitions underscore the physiognomic traits of shame inherent in the act of blushing: “Correrse vale afrentarse, porque le corre la sangre al rostro. Corrido, el confuso y afrentado. Corrimiento, la tal confusión o vergüenza. Andar corrido, andar... afrentado” (363). Similarly, ‘afrenta’ is defined as “el acto que se comete contra alguno en deshonor suyo, aunque sea hecho con razón y justicia, como açoitar a uno o sacarle a la vergüenza; y a este tal dezimos que le han afrentado [...] Dixose afrenta, quasi en la frente, porque de la vergüenza que toma el afrentado se salen colores al rostro y particularmente a la frente, por la sangre que sube al celebro” (47). In 1675, Antoine de Courtain provided an alternative etymology for afrenta that wonderfully underscores its emotional registers: “Porque la cara, que es el frente del cuerpo, no sólo es la parte más elevada y la que mejor señala la dignidad, sino que de todo el cuerpo, es la que mejor indica los sentimientos del alma. Ella se expande en la alegría y se contrae en la tristeza, por eso se la tiene por el alma misma, de suerte que afrentar o hacer una afrenta a alguien, es como darle un golpe en el corazón y en la parte más noble de sí mismo” (qtd. in Pérez Cortés 110).

8 Elsewhere I have studied in greater detail the importance of shame in these and other episodes from the novel, including its relation to humoral theory and the protagonist’s emotional evolution (“Don Quijote avergonzado”); as a “technology of the self” for Don Quijote (“Las tecnologías”); and its association with Mediterranean captivity in “La historia del cautivo” (“A Soldier’s Shame”).
degenerated the life conditions of the very people he aspired to help. Shame delineates the contours of his madness by involuntarily escaping the customary justifications he provides in other moments of impotence or failure, namely the excuse of enchantment. In the mendacious story of the robbery by galley slaves as well as the case of Andrés, Don Quijote finds himself suddenly incapable of supplying an alibi for his actions and, in its place, blood rushes to his face and signals his shame. In my primary example, however, the character’s shame becomes so great that he is left no other alleviation from its effects but to passively encloister himself in the psychological comforts of denial and disavowal which his otherwise accursed enchanter offers him. The priest and the barber’s deceptive ploy to return Don Quijote home at the end of Part One of the novel begins, in actuality, when they observe the potent effect on the knight of their feigned story of the *galeotes* robbery. In other words, they have recognized Don Quijote’s susceptibility—or, in Bourdieu’s terms, his “disposition”—to shame and, consequently, decide to exploit it as a means of manipulation toward a concrete end (which will in turn produce further shame for Don Quijote, thus recalling the emotional feedback loop suggested in my introductory remarks). It is in fact hard to imagine a more effective means of manipulation, parody, and punishment than shame for a character whose chivalric ethos is defined by such antithetical values of pride, renown, and fame.

Figure 1. José Jiménez Aranda, *Don Quijote de la Mancha* (Madrid, 1905-08; XX: 16). Reproduction of original sketch in Chinese ink and gouache white. *Cervantes Project*, Cushing Memorial Library, Texas A&M University.
The Art of Infamy in the Episodes of Encagement

The theatrical quality of the stratagem employed in order to convince Don Quijote to abandon his knight errantry and return home has been well documented (Díaz Plaja 115; Syverson-Stork 32-36), but I would like to suggest that these episodes represent the staging of a particular historic practice that, while equally dependent on theatricality, was of a considerably more sinister nature: that which was well known in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as “sacar a la vergüenza”. Turning to Covarrubias: “Sacar a uno a la vergüenza, es pena y castigo que se suele dar por algunos delitos, y a estos tales los suelen tener atados en el rollo por algún espacio de tiempo, con que quedan avergonzados y afrentados” (1002). This juridico-religious practice of shaming or escarnio público is referenced earlier in the episode of the galley slaves when one of the prisoners is overcome with emotion and unable to describe his crime. Another condemned man offers himself as a spokesperson to explain: “Este hombre honrado va por cuatro años a las galeras, habiendo paseado las acostumbradas, vestido, en pompa y a caballo”; Sancho then immediately confirms his acquaintance with the practice by responding: “Eso es... lo que a mí me parece, haber salido a la vergüenza” (I, 22, 261). The explicit mobilization of shame undergirds many of the well-documented forms of popular and inquisitorial punishment in medieval and early modern Europe, among them the charivari, stocks, yellow badge, pillory, sambenito, and auto-da-fé. The pittura infamante, a form of defamatory painting in Renaissance Italy, granted representational art the mandate of municipal justice in order to shame common
criminals through the proliferation of frescoes depicting the delinquent and his crime. Like Nathaniel Hawthorne’s famous ‘scarlet letter’, the practice of branding was another violent yet permanent means of inscribing shame on the body of slaves, delinquents, and criminals. The correspondence between particular iconographies of branding and national or linguistic conventions attests to their widespread use across the Mediterranean: the fleur-de-lis in France, the keys of Saint Peter in the papal states, and the “L” for *ladrones* in Spain all marked their victims with popularly recognized symbols for adjuring their crimes. Many of these practices, as was the case with inquisitorial procedure more generally, were inherited from ancient Roman law, which prescribed, for example, that fugitive slaves be branded with the letters “FUG” to alert others to their status as *fugitivus*, serving to stigmatize the bearer and attempting to deter further transgressions. In Castile, similar customs survived in the *Fuero Juzgo* and *Siete Partidas*, which called upon popular ridicule as a means of punishment and compliance through such acts as public beatings, the carrying of chains, the amputation of limbs, or being publicly disrobed and covered in honey and flies (Alfonso el Sabio, Partida VII, título 14, ley 18; Partida VII, título 31, ley 4). Although to some extent a commutation for penitents of the capital crimes of heresy and apostasy, a shame punishment nonetheless was regarded as exceedingly severe, since, according to Inquisition scholar Henry Charles Lea’s famous study, “those exposed to it regarded death as a mercy, preferring to die rather than to endure a life of infamy” (138). Whether in popular or inquisitional form, the exploitation of shame and infamy through penalty at once capitalized on their affective capacity as a form of social control while extending their viability in subjective consciousness and the public sphere.

Cervantes contemplates the practice of public shaming—and reflects upon its ethical ramifications—several times throughout his works. Beyond his typical penchant for referencing historical events, this is not altogether surprising given that the peak of the Inquisition’s activities between the years 1590 and 1620 (Bujanda 228) corresponds almost exactly to that of Cervantes’s literary activity. In the *Persiles*, he stresses the potency of shame punishments as a kind of spectacle with the story of Ortel Banedre, a Polish man humiliated by his wife’s adultery and consumed by the desire to avenge the conjugal affront (III, 6-7). Serving as the novel’s typical voice of tempered reason, however, Periando advises the jilted man:

> ¿Qué pensáis que os sucederá cuando la justicia os entregue a vuestros enemigos, atados y rendidos, encima de un teatro público, a la vista de infinitas gentes, y a vos, blandiendo el cuchillo encima del cadáhalso, amenazando el segarles las gargantas, como si pudiera su sangre limpiar, como vos decís, vuestra honra? ¿Qué os puede suceder, como digo, sino hacer más público vuestro agravio? Porque las venganzas castigan, pero no quitan

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9 Lea’s quote reflects what was inscribed in law by the *Siete Partidas*: “El infamado, aunque no haya culpa, muerto es en cuanto al bien y a la honra de este mundo” (qtd. in Menéndez Pidal 358), and in letters by Lope: “Porque no hay mayor castigo, Que dar vida a un afrentado” (*El testimonio vengado*, qtd. in Castro 338). Roberts also recognizes that shame and shunning can be more effective in garnering compliance than other, supposedly heavier-handed instruments of the law (26), while Nussbaum studies the ethics of shaming in the modern legal system.

10 For more information on Don Quijote’s own relation to the Inquisition, see Castro’s “Cervantes y la Inquisición” (*Obra reunida* 493-99). If, as Olmos García asserts, Cervantes exhibited “una actitud hostil” toward the Inquisition (81), then the case of Cenotia in the *Persiles* is probably the most convincing proof: “La persecución de los que llaman inquisidores en España me arrancó de mi patria, que cuando se sale por fuerza de ella, antes puede decirse arrancada que salida. Vine a esta isla por extraños rodeos, por infinitos peligros, casi siempre como si estuvieran cerca, volviendo la cabeza atrás, pensando que me mordian las faldas los perros, que aun hasta aquí temo” (II, 8: 332).
las culpas; y las que en estos casos se cometen, como la enmienda no proceda de la voluntad, siempre se están en pie, y siempre están vivas en las memorias de las gentes, al menos en tanto que vive el agraviado. Así que, señor, volved en vos y, dando lugar a la misericordia, no corráis tras la justicia. (III, 7, 501-02)

The logic of Periandro’s counsel revolves not around the law, justice, or personal virtue, but the degree of infamy which Banedre’s act of vengeance would undoubtedly bring upon him. Periandro further communicates the looming potentiality of shame by emphasizing his exposure to the gaze of “infinitas gentes”, and referring to the scaffold as a ‘public theatre’. The scaffold or gallows (cadahalso) was in fact placed in the express service of shame punishments in the early modern era, and, as Michel Foucault famously elucidated in Discipline and Punish, the supplice became a public spectacle of state power wielded to repress the populace through the extreme visibility of punishment. To use Foucault’s terminology, the affect of shame, I would suggest, becomes an especially potent “technology of representation” in the aesthetics of penalty deployed through the ‘public theatre’ of the scaffold. Periandro’s admonition that the only effect achieved in such an act would be to make his affront more public underscores the vital role of shame in the early modern Spanish imaginary and echoes a piece of exemplary wisdom from “La fuerza de la sangre”: “Más la simpatía una onza de deshonra pública que una arroba de infamia secreta” (Cervantes, Novelas ejemplares 396).

Another exemplary novel, “Rinconete y Cortadillo”, offers further insights for understanding the Cervantine take on public shaming when the eponymous characters and other professional pícaros in Seville, we recall, are convened to review the week’s business. Taking out his personal memory book, their illiterate leader Monipodio asks Rinconete to recite its contents, which notably includes the following subheading: “Memorial de agravios comunes, conviene a saber: redomazos, untos de miera, clavazón de sambenitos y cuernos, matracas, espantos, alborotos y cuchilladas fingidas, publicación de nibelos, etc.” (287). This enumeration of disturbances and delinquency reveals the appropriation of rituals of public shaming by a group of private citizens. In particular, the hanging of sambenitos and the publication of libelous acts represent a form of renegade justice directly informed by the inquisitorial practices of the State.

In other words, these outlaws make use of instruments of punishment that fall well within the law of seventeenth-century Spain, thereby leading to two important conclusions: first, that these types of shame punishment were effective enough in the public sphere to be adopted by citizen-criminals who, due to their position outside the law, would presumably have recourse to any number of additional means of intimidation, vengeance, and coercion. Second, Cervantes’s fictional portrayal attests to the common familiarity of these practices among the Spanish citizenry, a fact that, not incidentally, greatly accounted for their very efficacy. Even more significant, however, are Monipodio’s words as Rinconete continues to read the list of planned affronts but is stopped short of pronouncing the names of their targeted victims: “Tampoco se lea—dijo Monipodio—la casa ni adónde, que basta que se les haga el agravio, sin que se diga en público, que es gran cargo de conciencia. A lo menos, más querría yo clavar cien cuernos y otros

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11 A related theme can be found among the libros becerros and libros verdes, which recorded the inquisitorial sentences of generations of Castilian and Aragonese families and, due to their strong potential for shaming these families, were forbidden to possess by a royal decree of King Philip IV in 1623. The potential of a document or discourse to provoke shame in certain of its destinations or receivers also recalls various forms of satirical poetry such as the cantigas de maldecir and obras de burlas, especially the Coplas del Provincial (“the most defamatory ever written about any society” [Menéndez Pidal 90]).
tantos sambenitos, como se me pagase mi trabajo, que decillo sola una vez, aunque fuese a la madre que me partió” (287-88). The startling irruption of moral conscience in a figure who is otherwise portrayed as the unscrupulous ringleader of Seville’s criminal underground is meaningful in and of itself (288n). It is also curious and seemingly hypocritical that Monipodio so strongly adheres to a personal imperative to never publicly speak the name of the shamed (among fellow delinquents, no less), while at the same time perpetrating acts which expose them to even more public infamy. But the fact is that Cervantes’s choice to offer such an ethical reflection through the words of a criminal underscores the gravity and seriousness with which the author approaches the topic of public shaming.

If in the Novelas ejemplares a gang of commissioned outlaws appropriates legal forms of shame punishments, then another group of outlaws pays for their crimes several-fold in the final chapters of Don Quijote. I am referring to the moments just before the principle characters are captured by Roque Guinart and his gang of bandoleros, when Sancho becomes frightened upon noticing legs and feet dangling from some trees, to which Don Quijote responds: “No tienes de qué tener miedo, porque estos pies y piernas que tientas y no vees sin duda son de algunos forajidos y bandoleros que en estos árboles están ahorcados, que por aquí los suele ahorcar la justicia, cuando los coge, de veinte en veinte y de treinta en treinta; por donde me doy a entender que debo de estar cerca de Barcelona.” The narrator immediately confirms that “así era la verdad como él lo había imaginado. Al partir, alzaron los ojos y vieron los racimos de aquellos árboles, que eran cuerpos de bandoleros” (II, 60, 1221). Although banditry was widely associated with the Mediterranean enclave of Catalonia, this kind of penal spectacle was in fact practiced across much of Castile as well (Bernaldo de Quirós 11-13; 59-60). And while public shaming was popularly regarded as more severe than death, both punitive methods coincide in this practice. This was essentially a makeshift extension of the pillory, since in the absence of a picota or rollo criminals were sometimes hung from prominent trees, which, like their architectural counterparts of stone, were often situated near the entrance to a town or municipal district so as to advertise to residents and visitors alike the potent authority of the local “justicia”. In fact, the tall, imposing structure of the pillory acquired a nearly iconographic association with infamy and shame, as attested by its lexicological inheritance in contemporary idioms such as “poner en la picota” and “enviar/hacer ir al rollo” (similar to the English expression “to pillory”). As original epicenters of local justice, it is somewhat ironic that the areas of the town immediately surrounding the pillory came to acquire a reputation for delinquency and infamy themselves, leading to speculation that some families even uprooted their homes to avoid these peri-penal zones (Bernaldo de Quirós 87). A similar phenomenon surrounded the figure of the executioner or verdugo, whose profession garnered such figures a loathsome reputation as both dispatchers and depositories of shame, influencing urban development through inhabitants’ desire not to live anywhere near them. What each of these examples makes clear is the powerfully contagious

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12 The Latin terms arbor infelix, arbori suspendere, and infelix lignum all refer to what in the Western world has undoubtedly become the most iconic shame punishment of them all: that of crucifixion. In ancient Roman territories, crucifixion (supplicium servile) indexed the social status of its victim, having been reserved for slaves and enemies of the state, while noble citizens were afforded less shameful forms of punishment such as fines, exile, or at most, decapitation. The capital punishment of hanging was also regarded as shameful, and the particular posture of hanging (without causing death) even gained an associative connotation of shame, an image which calls to mind Don Quijote’s humiliation at being left hanging outside the inn after having his hand tied by Maritornes (I, 43, 559-60). For an in-depth study of the iconography of hanging, including its association with the pitture infamanti and the mundus inversus, see Mills.
nature of shame in the early modern popular imaginary, its seeming ability to spread and infect through spatial and interpersonal proximity. Like the ill-fated bandoleros in the novel, the suspended, lifeless bodies served the dual historical function of shaming the criminals and their families as well as intending to deter other citizens from similar transgressions of legal and religious authority.

Although Don Quijote’s own fate is not as immediate or terminal, the oxcart used to deliver him home performs a function homologous to that of the trees: as another kind of makeshift pillory, it is the material structure responsible for ensuring that he is exposed to a protracted visibility before public spectators. Like the branches of the trees or arbori suspendere, the wooden bars of his cage can be said to suspend the feeling of shame, to hold it in place for all to see. Suffused with pathos, Doré’s engraving of this scene (Figure 3) foregrounds this effect by placing the viewer in the cage with Don Quijote and thus subjecting her to the same piercing gaze of the grotesque figures who crowd in from all sides to witness the spectacle. Similar practices were employed by the Spanish Inquisition as means of publicly shaming citizens who had been accused of perpetrating such petty crimes as theft. One account describes the events of January 1605 along the Guadalquivir in Seville, where several confraternities had gathered to perform a “triste pero cristiana tarea”: “Desenterrar los cadáveres de los ahogados en el río y de los asaeteados por la Santa Hermandad y quitar de las escarpias y jaulas en que, por los caminos, estaban expuestos los despojos de los delincuentes á quienes las justicias habían hecho descuartizar de un año á aquella parte” (Rodríguez Marín 205). Later, as part of granting the deceased criminals a proper Christian burial, the members of the pious orders prepared these remains for the procesión de los huesos, “una de las más extrañas procesiones de que hay noticia en los anales de nuestras ceremonias eclesiásticas,” in which they were paraded through the city by a diverse entourage of priests, confraternities, and clerics (Rodríguez Marín 206-207). As in the aforementioned hanging of bandits, this particular punishment was exacted to lethal ends, along with a public spectacle of infamy. Like the priest and the barber in Don Quijote, the inquisitorial authorities used “jaulas” for displaying their victims while parading through the streets. What is significant is that both parties—executioners and redeemers—employed the procession as a mobile ritual for exposing the remains of these former criminals to the eyes of the masses, first as punishment and later as pardon.

The similarly visual and spectacle-like qualities of Don Quijote’s encagement invite us to consider it a narrative form of the pitture infamanti, commissioned by the priest’s religious authority (“trazador desta máquina” [I, 46, 587]) and ekphrastically produced throughout the final chapters of Part One of the novel. The centrality of shame in these episodes is confirmed by the intentions and actions of other characters, the proliferation of metaphorical references to shame in the narration, and, most importantly, Don Quijote’s own behavior and affective reactions to his treatment. Similar to the silent shame which he displayed in earlier examples as well as that of the old galley slave, Don Quijote’s demeanor while in the cage confirms that he has intuited and internalized the shame of his punishment: “iba sentado en la jaula, las manos atadas, tendidos los pies y arrimado a las verjas, con tanto silencio y tanta paciencia como si no fuera hombre de carne, sino estatua de piedra” (I, 47, 594). In spite of the differing landscapes, composition, and technique, his physical stance in Puiggarf’s depiction of this scene (Figure 2) greatly resembles that of Jiménez Aranda’s representation of his shame before Sancho (Figure 1): motionless state, lowered head, downward gaze, and a passive, nearly cowering posture. To recognize that many of these outward cues are similar to what we might imagine would feature
in a representation of melancholia, we need only recall the angelic figure of Dürer’s famous 1514 engraving of the same name. The Caballero de la Triste Figura, the text reports, indeed felt melancholy in the cage, and the partly shared physiognomy of shame with this emotion serves to underscore, as I noted earlier, the often complex interrelationality between affective states in lived experience as well as in the novel. But we might also imagine, had Jiménez Aranda and Puiggarí not worked in a black-and-white medium, that they would have complemented such bodily symptoms by adding a light dash of red to Don Quijote’s cheeks.

When he is first placed in the cage, the barber, masking his true identity, proclaims prophetically: “¡Oh Caballero de la Triste Figura!, no te dé afincamiento la prisión en que vas, porque así conviene para acabar más presto la aventura en que tu gran esfuerzo te puso. La cual se acabará cuando el furibundo león manchado con la blanca paloma tobosina yoguieren en uno” (I, 46, 588). While embellishing the performance of Don Quijote’s capture, this statement also reveals the recognition of its capacity to produce shame. Specifically, “afincamiento” anticipates the general humiliation of the scene and “manchado” represents a play on words between manchego and mancillado (588n). The mancha, or stain, on the man of La Mancha’s reputation is exacerbated precisely by the shameful spectacle of his public imprisonment. Later, when knight and squire have the opportunity to consult privately about what Don Quijote believes are the consequences of enchantment and what Sancho clearly sees to be a grand artifice, the latter humorously attempts to persuade his master with empirical evidence: “Pregunto, hablando con acatamiento, si acaso después que vuestra merced va en jaulado y a su parecer encantado en esta jaula le ha venido gana y voluntad de hacer aguas mayores o menores, como suele decirse” (I, 48, 611). Sancho’s prefacing of his query with “acatamiento” confirms the commonplace that bodily functions were of themselves considered shameful, and Don Quijote’s response that “no anda todo limpio” reinforces the scatological quality of the scene while insisting on the stain—in this case literal as well as figurative—which may come to his honor as a result of his encagement (I, 48, 612).

Even more significant is the fact that these examples, tacitly yet unmistakably, point toward the far more troubling Iberian program of limpieza de sangre. Begging the priest to allow Don Quijote to momentarily vacate his cage in order to evacuate his bowels, Sancho declares that “si no le dejaban salir, no iría tan limpia aquella prisión como requiría la decencia de un tal caballero como su amo” (I, 49, 613). The metonymical remove here between the bodily fluids of “aguas mayores o menores” and blood is minuscule enough as to leave little doubt of the latter’s patent symbolism. Along with the metaphors of cleanliness signaled above (“manchado”; “no anda todo limpio”), these insistent details clearly evoke the historical forms of racial and religious persecution which haunted the Spain of Cervantes’s time. The societal and institutional racism which sanctioned the forced conversion, expulsion, or execution of countless Moors and Jews on the Peninsula, in fact, often masqueraded under nearly identical metaphors of blood purity, as attested by the proliferation of a limpio/sucio motif in historical documents of official as well as popular natures.13 Sancho’s deceptively innocent observation “que estas visiones que

13 An example of this motif—along with what may be the most compelling proof yet of the differentiation between honor and shame—can be found in an anonymous (though perhaps apocryphal) seventeenth-century “papel” on the statutes of limpieza de sangre: “En España ay dos géneros de nobleza. Una mayor, que es la Hidalguía, y otra menor, que es la Limpieza, que llamamos Christianos viejos. Y aunque la primera de la Hidalguía es más honrado tenerla; pero muy más afrentoso es faltar la segunda; porque en España muy más estimamos a un hombre pechero y limpio que a un hidalgo que no es limpio” (qtd. in Domínguez Ortiz 196; 229).
por aquí andan, que no son del todo católicas” lays bare the original inquisitional mandate of prosecuting the crimes of heresy and apostasy which threatened the hegemony of Catholic doctrine, while nearly stretching to the limit any latent ambiguity regarding the episode’s suggestive subtext (I, 47, 591). “Muchas y muy graves historias he yo leído de caballeros andantes,” admits Don Quijote, “pero jamás he leído, ni visto, ni oído que a los caballeros encantados los lleven desta manera” (I, 47, 590). Such a strikingly frank assessment by the condemned knight is perhaps the most overt evidence yet for the reader that the stakes of this episode are more urgent than a mere parodical reworking of the romances of chivalry. That the referent is lost on Don Quijote only serves to underscore the persistence of the real and reinforce the historical gravity of the apparent novelty of his punishment. The distinction between history and fiction that is prescribed so emphatically by the priest and canon throughout these same chapters of the novel asserts itself rather more forcefully here: the “[m]uchas y muy graves historias” of Don Quijote’s fictional world would seem to pale in comparison to the reality of his firsthand experience of public shaming in the cage.

Further implicit indications that the shaming of Don Quijote is modeled on early modern inquisitorial practice abound. The presence of the cuadrilleros, cura, and canónigo—representing royal and ecclesiastical authority—and their overseeing and sanctioning of Don Quijote’s punishment lend it an official juridico-religious quality. Furthermore, the spectacle of the entourage greatly resembles the aforementioned historical processions sponsored by the Holy Office in which the condemned were publicly paraded through the streets, often on the way to an auto de fe. This theme is complemented by the appearance of the disciplinantes, whose penitence would have recalled for the early modern reader well-known religious imagery of a similar context. The public auto de fe, like the elaborate scheme to return Don Quijote home, “was a meticulously planned, stage-managed theatrical event” (Rawlings 37). The further striking parallels between it and Don Quijote’s arrival to his village can be witnessed in the following passage:

Llegaron a la aldea de don Quijote, adonde entraron en la mitad del día, que acertó a ser domingo, y la gente estaba toda en la plaza, por mitad de la cual atravesó el carro de don Quijote. Acudieron todos a ver lo que en el carro venía y, cuando conocieron a su compatrioto, quedaron maravillados, y un muchacho acudió corriendo a dar las nuevas a su ama y a su sobrina de que su tío y su señor venía flaco y amarillo y tendido sobre un montón de heno y sobre un carro de bueyes. (I, 52, 644)

The auto de fe general, as in my opening example of the events in Triana, also typically occurred on Sundays in the main plaza of the town and always drew large crowds of onlookers who came to witness the spectacle (Lea 212-13; Rawlings 37). The yellowness of Don Quijote’s complexion, in addition to the color’s association with melancholy and indication of his sheer depravity after six days of traveling in a cage, calls up the image of penitents whose sambenitos of yellow signified their contrition and desire for reconciliation (as opposed to the black sambenitos worn by the unrepentant).

Indeed it is the act of reconciliation which colors the Canon’s exhortation to Don Quijote that he return to reason: “¡Ea, señor don Quijote, duélase de sí mismo y redúzgase al gremio de la discreción y sepa usar de la mucha que el cielo fue servido de darle, empleando el felicísimo talento de su ingenio en otra letura que redunde en aprovechamiento de su conciencia y en aumento de su honra!” (I, 49, 616). The metaphorical use of the expression “reducirse al gremio” may well be the most manifest example of Cervantes’s appropriation of an inquisitorial discourse
throughout the episode: it referred to the historical practice of appearing before the Inquisition in order to undertake formal reconciliation with the Catholic Church after having apostatized. Besides his direct entreaty to Don Quijote, the Canon’s extensive indictment of the romances of chivalry could be said to perform a function parallel to that of the Sermón de la Fe, a public sermon which always accompanied the auto de fe and served a pedagogical and proselytizing objective upon the spectators. These sermons complemented the instructive potency of the processions and the staging of shame in the public exposure of the condemned, reinforcing social and religious conformity and the hegemony of the Old Christian model. Don Quijote’s response to his shame punishment indicates it has been equally effective. His uncharacteristic passivity, resignation, silence, and acceptance of his fate of imprisonment, while significant manifestations of the defeated knight’s shame, also suggest he is self-conscious and even repentant of his (ab)errant behavior. The hackneyed excuse of enchantment notwithstanding, Don Quijote’s willful return to the cage implies a bid of atonement for his errant transgressions and links him once again to processional penitents, his shabby (and soiled?) underclothes standing in for the yellow scapulars of the sambenitos.\(^\text{14}\)

### Conclusion: Inhabiting Shame with Don Quijote

I would like to conclude, however, by suggesting an alternative interpretation of Don Quijote’s shaming in the cage, one which underwrites an investment of even greater political stakes and harbors the potential to destabilize the honor discourse from the inside out. For Castro, Cervantes conceived of honor not as a quality inherited through blood and nobility, but as a personal virtue, “un bien más interno que externo” (1956, 363), an idea conspicuously announced in Don Quijote as well: “La honra pudéla tener el pobre, pero no el vicioso” (II, Prologue, 677). Similarly, an implicit rejection of vengeance and violence as means of responding to an affront to one’s honor has also been perceived in Cervantes’s works, such as in my previous examples as well as Sancho’s own words: “No hay para qué… tomar venganza de nadie, pues no es de buenos cristianos tomarla de los agravios” (II, 11, 782). In point of fact, the renunciation of personal vengeance was consistent with the increasing desires of royal, governmental, and legal bodies to bring the management and punishment of disputes—traditionally settled through individual, familial, and clan-based claims to honor and vengeance—under the purview of the early modern State (Caro Baroja 1966, 98-99). This renders the appropriation of inquisitorial discourse and practice in the enjaulamiento episodes all the more poignant: that individual citizens wield the political tool of punitive shame as a means of controlling Don Quijote parodies not only the character, his madness, and the romances of chivalry, but also the structures of power which increasingly sought to remit the control of personal honor to the state. While reflecting upon what a powerful weapon shame can be in the

\(^{14}\) As I have detailed elsewhere (“Don Quijote avergonzado”), the shaming of Don Quijote portends even broader implications when juxtaposed with the Canon and the priest’s damning portrayal of the romances of chivalry, since shame can be seen to perform an analogous role at the metanarrative level as well. The protagonist’s placement in the cage represents a symbolic indictment of the books responsible for his madness, his deviation from the normative standards of sanity corresponding to the aesthetic deviance with which the authors of the romances of chivalry betrayed the prescriptive norms of Aristotelian verisimilitude. The scrutiny to which Don Quijote and these books are subjected recalls the similarly inquisitorial undertones of the scene in which the priest and the barber judge which books from Don Quijote’s library to condemn to the fire (I, 6).
hands of authority, however, Cervantes suggests that the emotion may serve as a form of resistance to those very structures of power.

While recent historical studies have also speculated that extra-literary honor was not reserved exclusively for nobles, old Christians, and other elite members of society (Taylor; Horden and Purcell 519-522), what remains clear is that shame, on the other hand, was readily available and abundant for all. By its very nature, it is agnostic to privilege, whether cultural, social, economic, or religious. As a kind of universal, democratic affect of the commoner, shame thus contains the potential to disrupt the dominant order and the discourse of prestige which attended early modern historical claims to honor. Indeed, honor can be seen as a sort of shibboleth or cipher for the Iberian programs of limpieza de sangre, through which claims to honor were necessarily mediated—and quite often foreclosed—by one’s ethno-religious past. The conversos, moriscos, and marranos were all surely well acquainted with the feeling of shame, even if they were privately able to maintain a certain pride in their traditions. We might even draw a parallel between the ontological status of these crypto-Jews and Muslims and shame’s own will to concealment. If “the body’s expressions—including that classic one of shame, the hanging of the head—act as a metonym for the wider structures of social domination” (Probyn 53), then there could hardly be a more striking reminder of the politics of limpieza de sangre than the blush whose appearance depends in an equally vital way upon the same bodily fluid. Along these lines, Don Quijote’s compliance with his shame punishment can be suggestively read as an invitation to adopt the subject position of these members of history’s defeated, as a kind of ‘virtue of losers’; on the one hand, it represents a rejection of the violence and vengeance which characterized the hegemonic discourse of honor in early modern Spain and, on the other, a refusal to conform to that very discourse by embracing shame as an alternative ontology. Instead of making recourse to external mechanisms of vengeance (as we might expect in Lope or Calderón’s honor plays) and thus perpetuating forms of punishment similar to that suffered by his primary character, Cervantes suggests that vergüenza may serve as a means of peaceful resistance to state-based and popular forms of violence, as a way of arresting the feedback loop, as it were.

Moreover, as a tool for reflecting on the racial, religious, and imperial conflicts which traversed Cervantes’s Mediterranean, shame holds a unique power to call forth the stories and subjects that risk becoming lost in the expansive dimensions and unifying interests of Mediterraneanizing projects. As I noted in my introduction, such a risk is apparent in both Castro’s strong rebuke of Braudel for relegating the human—and dehumanizing—elements of Mediterranean history to a grand economic system, as well as the tendency to conflate honor and shame as merely two sides of the same essentialist coin. Recovering shame as its own distinct emotional currency corresponds, then, to rescuing the forgotten “microecologies” or local (hi)stories of Mediterranean subjectivity. To pull them from the cage of the homogenizing logics of historiography is to remember the struggles of those punished by the dominant forces of history, a move analogous to Sancho’s empathetic and unsettling call to consciousness in directly confronting the priest: “Todo esto que he dicho, señor cura, no es más de por encarecer a su paternidad haga conciencia del mal tratamiento que a mi señor se le hace, y mire bien no le pida Dios en la otra vida esta prisión de mi amo” (I, 47, 597). This is what makes the novel so unsettling as well, both from a political and aesthetic perspective: the reader is offered no easy outlet from the suffering of shame and, having identified with Don Quijote as a “sufridor de afrentas” (I, 52, 643), is therefore obligated to inhabit or embody it in a similar way, to consider
the ethical repercussions of and possibilities within shame, to meditate on the ‘virtue of losers’ from the defeated’s own position and on his or her own terms, to adopt an anamorphic or bottom-up perspective on the world—as in Doré’s depiction—from within the cage. In short, to acknowledge the marginalized of the *mare nostrum* by prompting an inversion or alternative view of Mediterranean ‘values’. The novel’s ability to make shame linger in this way is a prime example of Cervantes’s talent for articulating the deep emotional registers of Mediterranean lived experience and for wielding affect as both a political and aesthetic instrument. But that he makes Don Quijote sally forth again in 1615, pride intact, is perhaps the most powerful gesture of all.\(^\text{15}\)

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