Cervantes’s *Don Quijote*, Part 2, and the Spanish Reason-of-State Tradition

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The conversation between don Quijote, the barber and the curate regarding “esto que llaman razón de estado y modos de gobierno” that opens Part 2 of *Don Quijote* is well known. Yet Cervantes’s engagement with the Spanish anti-Machiavellian reason-of-state tradition throughout Part 2, to which he so clearly alludes in this passage, has remained unclear until now. This is undoubtedly due to a misunderstanding of the anti-Machiavellians themselves, as historians and literary critics have tended to accept without question their own self-fashioning. Recently, however, it has become clear that Giovanni Botero, Pedro de Rivadeneyra and their Spanish imitators throughout the Baroque attack an invented straw figure of Machiavelli while simultaneously they adapt key Machiavellian concepts to their own Catholic worldview. This adaptation necessarily resulted in a duality between idealism and practicality in their own advice to the successive Spanish kings, as they attempted in various ways to convince their readers that the only way for a prince to conserve his state was by being a true Christian. Throughout Part 2, Cervantes subtly engages with reason-of-state discourse, in the form of don Quijote’s advice to Sancho, in imitation of the mirror-of-princes tradition, and also in a series of examples presented in the narrative world of don Quijote and Sancho. These examples—two portraits of princes and one victim of real Spanish reason-of-state policy—confront and subvert the political ideas in vogue in Cervantes’s time, by questioning their applicability in reality. The portrait of the Duke and the Duchess, presented in direct opposition to Sancho, warns readers of the dangerous possibility that rulers could use reasons of state not for the common good but for personal gain. On the other hand, the bandolero Roque Guinart is an ironic example of a Machiavellian prince, who cultivates the love of his subjects when he can, but does not hesitate to use cruelty when necessity demands it. Finally, the Morisco Ricote highlights the unjust results of the expulsion of the Moriscos, which in Cervantes’s time was supported by reason-of-state discourse.

In studies that have considered Cervantes’s own political thought, the chapters of *Don Quijote* dedicated to Sancho’s governorship of the Ínsula Barataria have attracted the most attention. Readers have pointed out how closely don Quijote’s advice so Sancho follows Erasmus’s *Education of a Christian Prince* and Erasmian Spanish texts such as Alfonso de Valdés’s *Diálogo de Mercurio y Carón* and Antonio de Guevara’s *Relox de príncipes*, emphasizing the need for the ruler to self-govern and the idea that political virtues should be consistent with Christian humanism (Cascardi 149). While these studies reveal Cervantes’s engagement with the Erasmian tradition, their portraits of Cervantes as a political thinker remains incomplete. By the time Cervantes is writing Part 2, the reason-of-state tradition had risen to dominance in Spanish

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1 For many years, Hispanist literary critics have relied on Fernández-Santamaría’s account of the Spanish reason-of-state tradition. Corteguera, one such critic, asserts that “Cervantes did not participate directly” in the debate on reason of state (263). Di salvo, apparently unfamiliar with Fernández-Santamaría, nevertheless reveals a similar misunderstanding of the Spanish reason-of-state tradition. See now Howard, chapters 3 and 4 (69-128).

2 For a recent review of attempts to interpret the Barataria episode of *Don Quijote*, see Fernández Rodríguez-Escalona (125-31). See also Cascardi’s more recent treatment of this same episode (130-64).

3 Bleznick, in particular, highlights the similarities between Erasmus’s *Education of a Christian Prince* and don Quijote’s advice. Percas de Ponseti compares several pieces of don Quijote’s advice to passages from Alfonso de Valdés’s *Diálogo de Mercurio y Carón*. Chiong Rivero demonstrates in detail the affinities between don Quijote’s advice and Guevara’s *Relox de príncipes*. 

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political discourse, subsuming, if not replacing, an older, idealistic Erasmian discourse. By focusing exclusively on Erasmus and his imitators, critics have not adequately taken into account the extent to which these sources were mediated through the Spanish reason-of-state tradition, which was immensely popular, by the time Cervantes sat down to write Part 2 of Don Quijote. In don Quijote’s advice Cervantes engages directly the reason-of-state tradition, and thus indirectly the Machiavellian discourse that these writers adapted to the Catholic worldview. Perhaps the most important aspect of Machiavelli’s thought that the anti-Machiavellians accepted was a shift in emphasis from essence to appearance: while medieval political treatises stress the need for the king to be good in every way, post-Machiavellian writers focus on the need for the king to cultivate the reputation of being a good Christian.

In the last decades of the sixteenth century, anti-Machiavellism had become so ingrained in both academic and popular European culture, that authors who had no direct knowledge of Machiavelli whatsoever would imitate real anti-Machiavellian discourse. On the other hand, careful readers of Machiavelli also fashioned themselves as anti-Machiavellian even though their own political ideas evince a careful rereading of the Prince and/or the Discourses on Livy. Such is the case of Giovanni Botero, whose Della ragion di stato libri dieci (1589) was first translated by the famous historian Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas in 1592. After presenting himself in his prologue as anti-Machiavellian, Botero proceeds to use the concept of a limited reason of state, embraced by the Church, in order to adapt silently certain Machiavellian ideas regarding the conservation of a Catholic prince’s state. Throughout his treatise, Botero agrees with Machiavelli’s reorganization of traditional political discourse, by subverting its dichotomies—king and tyrant, virtue and vice, love and hatred—in the pursuit of the good of the whole kingdom, including the king, who by natural and divine law is considered the head of the body politic.

Following closely the publication of Herrera’s translation, Pedro de Ribadeneyra continues a process of popularizing Botero’s reason of state in Spain. In his Tratado de la religión y virtudes que debe tener el príncipe cristiano para gobernar y conservar sus estados, contra lo que Nicolás Maquiavelo y los políticos deste tiempo enseñan (1595), Ribadeneyra continues and intensifies Botero’s self-characterization as anti-Machiavellian, utilizing a mischaracterization of Machiavelli that he most likely took from Antonio Possevino’s Judicium (1592), to establish a clear yet purely rhetorical division between good, Christian reason of state and false, Machiavellian reason of state.4 Similar to Botero before him, Ribadeneyra demonstrates an intense familiarity with the Prince and the Discourses, translating long passages from both texts into Spanish in order to refute them. Despite this pretense of opposition, throughout book 2 of his treatise, which treats all of the other virtues besides religion which are necessary for the Christian prince, Ribadeneyra adopts Machiavelli’s reorganization of the traditional virtues, as he justifies a similar moral flexibility for the same reasons—when necessity demands it for the common good. The rhetorically constructed opposition between true and false reason of state allows Ribadeneyra to incorporate much of Machiavelli’s advice into his own treatise. For both Machiavelli and Ribadeneyra, the reality of politics creates a necessity for rulers to be morally flexible in order to conserve their states and bring about the common good.

According to both Botero and Ribadeneyra, if the goal of reason of state is the conservation of the king’s position for the benefit of the whole kingdom, then the self-conscious cultivation of his reputation is paramount. Botero asks his readers to consider, when the original kings were

4 Anglo has demonstrated that Possevino probably never read any of Machiavelli’s works, drawing from Innocent Gentillet’s Anti-Machiavel (1576) to summarize and condemn him, and that Ribadeneyra subsequently drew from Possevino (386-90).
elected, which was more important, love or reputation gained through their valor? “Sin duda fue la reputación, porque los pueblos no se mouieron a ello, por fauorecer y complacer a nadie, sino por el bien publico, y por esto no eligieron a los mas graciosos y blandos, sino a los mas valerosos” (11). The king who more likely will bring about the common good is not necessarily one who earns the love of his subjects, but the one who will use his valor to defend his own position of power from internal threats as well as his entire country from external enemies. For his part, Ribadeneyra objects to Machiavelli’s emphasis on reputation, because it does not take into consideration God’s divine providence: “Pero no depende la conservacion del Estado principalmente de la buena ó mala opinion de los hombres, aunque la buena se debe procurar y granjear con las verdaderas virtudes, y no con las aparentes, sino la voluntad del Señor, que es el que da los estados y los conserva, y los quita y traspasa á su voluntad” (521). Nevertheless, throughout his discussion of virtues in book 2 of his treatise, Ribadeneyra focuses not on “la voluntad del Señor,” but precisely on the “opinion de los hombres,” as we shall see. This two-facedness—the rhetorical pretense of anti-Machiavellism combined with the acceptance of important aspects of Machiavelli’s thought—which would become a hallmark of the Spanish reason-of-state tradition—becomes the target of Cervantes’s ridicule in don Quijote’s advice to Sancho.

In his undeniably Erasmian advice to Sancho before he sets off to govern Barataria, Cervantes subtly highlights the contradictions inherent in the Spanish Reason-of-State tradition, by repeatedly bringing to the surface a preoccupation with the cultivation of Sancho’s reputation. The first piece of advice that don Quijote gives to Sancho reminds the reader of the main point of the anti-Machiavellians, that the prince should rule according to the laws of God: “Primeramente, ¡oh hijo!, has de temer a Dios; porque en el temerle está la sabiduría, y siendo sabio no podrás errar en nada” (970). This advice could be traced back as far as God’s revelation to King David in the Psalms. However, in the context of the early seventeenth century, it serves to remind the readers of the agreement between don Quijote’s worldview and that of the anti-Machiavellian writers on reason of state: namely, that the good king must be a good and sincere Christian. For example, in his Príncipe cristiano, Ribadeneyra writes: “el primero y más principal cuidado de los reyes y príncipes debe ser el acudir á Dios y guardar su santa ley” (467). Don Quijote follows the anti-Machiavellians’ insistence that good kings must follow God’s laws.

Nevertheless, the following series of advice regarding Sancho’s humble origins contains a duality between idealistic, Christian precepts and practical, Machiavellian means and goals. It is significant that don Quijote dedicates roughly half of his advice in chapter 2.42 to a discussion of Sancho’s humble origins. In a conversation between don Quijote and Sancho soon after they arrive at the castle of the Duke and Duchess, don Quijote reveals his fear that Sancho will expose them both as frauds. Don Quijote admonishes Sancho for asking doña Rodríguez to take care of his rucio: “¿No adviertes, angustiado de ti, y malaventurado de mí, que si veen que tú eres un grosero villano, o un mentecato gracioso, pensarán que yo soy algún echacuervos, o algún caballero de mohatra?” (883). Perhaps because of this insecurity, while don Quijote advises Sancho to act in accordance with Christian laws during his governorship, the goal of these acts, in contrast, is to maintain a good reputation as governor.

To begin, don Quijote states the following: “los no de principios nobles deben acompanar la gravedad del cargo que ejercitan con una blanda suavidad que, guiada por la prudencia, los libre de la murmuración maliciosa, de quien no hay estado que se escape” (970). According to Percas de Ponseti, this piece of advice seems to reflect King Polidoro’s counsel in Valdés’s Diálogo de Mercurio y Carón by Valdés (201). However, this comparison does not take into account the goal
that don Quijote has in mind for Sancho: to avoid “murmuración maliciosa.” Clearly, don Quijote is concerned with Sancho’s reputation so that he might conserve his state, his “estado.” Later on, don Quijote echoes this same advice on clemency: “Cuando pudiere y debiere tener lugar la equidad, no cargues todo el rigor de la ley al delincuente; que no es mejor la fama del juez riguroso que la del compasivo” (971). He advises Sancho to be lenient whenever possible, because the reputation of a rigorous judge is no better than that of a compassionate one. In other words, don Quijote advises Sancho to be virtuous, acting with compassion toward his subjects; however, the goal of virtue here is not divine, for Sancho to save his soul, but worldly, to gain and maintain a good reputation among his subjects.

Ribadeneyra’s treatment of clemency is also practical in nature: “cualquiera castigo que hiciere, hacerle de manera que se entienda que es celo de justicia, y no saña y venganza; porque la ira arrebatada y la cólera en el príncipe es muy fea y dañosa” (546). Ribadeneyra’s use of the verb entender in the subjunctive expresses how the prince should make an attempt to maintain a good reputation among his subjects, thus forgoing his insistence on the importance of God’s divine laws in favor of a secular, Machiavellian analysis of political power. Similarly, don Quijote demonstrates to Sancho the utility of acting with clemency by saying that in this way he will gain a good reputation among his subjects.

Later, don Quijote warns Sancho not to be subjective in his judgments for two reasons: first, the damage caused is usually irrevocable; and second, it will harm his credit as a judge. “No te ciegue la pasión propia en la causa ajena; que los yerros que en ella hiciere, las más veces serán sin remedio; y si le tuvieran, será a costa de tu crédito” (972). On the one hand, Sancho is encouraged to be unselfish, thinking only of others while governing. On the other hand, one of the reasons for behaving in this way that don Quijote offers is purely practical: his credit or reputation as a good judge will diminish as a result of his selfishness.

The last piece of advice that don Quijote gives to Sancho in chapter 2.42 again repeats the counsel that Sancho be clement; however, he adds that Sancho be pious: “en todo cuanto fuere de tu parte, sin hacer agravio a la contraria, muéstratele piadoso y clemente; porque, aunque los atributos de Dios todos son iguales, más resplandece y campea a nuestro ver el de la misericordia, que el de la justicia” (972). The addition that Sancho must be pious is important, because it is the fundamental concern of the anti-Machiavellians. As we have seen, don Quijote begins his advice with the anti-Machiavellian precept that princes should above all follow the laws of Christ. In fact, this was one of the principal points of contention that the anti-Machiavellians brought to bear in their readings of Machiavelli. Throughout his political writings, Machiavelli puts forth the idea that the prince need not necessarily be good and virtuous in every way and at all times, but he must maintain the external appearance or reputation of virtue, especially in matters of religion. In contrast, Botero, Ribadeneyra and their imitators insist that only the true Catholic religion works in this way, and then only when the prince is sincere. Botero, for example, agrees with Machiavelli regarding the usefulness of religion for the conservation of the king’s state; however, he must be truly Catholic: “es dificultosa cosa, que el que no es verdadero religioso sea tenido por tal: porque no ay cosa que menos dure que la disimulacion. Deue pues el Principe de todo coraçon humillarse delante de la diuina Magestad, y reconocer della el Reyno, y la obediencia de los vassallos” (59-60). The reason for being a true Christian that Botero offers, however, is not for the king to save his soul, but to preserve his reputation among his subjects, simply because it would be difficult to hide, to dissimulate, any religious sincerity. Similarly, the reason don Quijote offers Sancho for following this counsel again stresses the importance of maintaining a good reputation among his future subjects: while before God all the Christian virtues are treated equally, before a prince’s
subjects those of piety and mercy shine the brightest, even more so than justice itself. The implication is that when it comes to the conservation of his state, the prince should concern himself not necessarily with God’s judgment, but with his subjects’.

Cervantes continues to present this combination of ideals and practicality when Sancho, with the help of don Quijote’s advice, carries out his governorship in Barataria. For example, in his answer to the bridge riddle, Sancho demonstrates that he has absorbed don Quijote’s counsel: “Soy de parecer... que le dejen pasar libremente, pues siempre es alabado más el hacer bien que mal, y esto lo diera firmado de mi nombre, si supiera firmar; y yo en este caso no he hablado de mí, sino que se me vino a la memoria un precepto, entre otros muchos que me dio mi amo don Quijote la noche antes que viniese a ser gobernador desta ínsula: que fue que cuando la justicia estuviese en duda, me decantase y acogiese a la misericordia” (1047). Although Sancho humorously reminds everyone that he does not even know how to sign his name, he demonstrates that he has remembered not only the idealistic virtue of clemency, but also the reason-of-state end of maintaining a good reputation as governor among his subjects, as is evident in his use of the term “alabado.” Indeed, this solution seems to produce the desired effect, and the majordomo’s reaction represents the reputation Sancho has gained for himself: “tengo para mí que el mismo Licurgo, que dio leyes a los lacedemonios, no pudiera dar mejor sentencia que la que el gran Panza ha dado” (1047).

The advice that Sancho finds in don Quijote’s letter, which he receives right before his entourage plays the last joke on him, again points the readers to the duality of the anti-Machiavellians. For example, at one point he warns Sancho about certain behaviors that will provoke his subjects to rebel: “No te muestres, aunque por ventura lo seas—lo cual yo no creo—, codicioso, mujeriego ni glotón; porque en sabiendo el pueblo y los que te tratan tu inclinación determinada, por allí te darán batería, hasta derribarte en el profundo de la perdición” (1049). Ribadeneyra similarly advises the Christian prince to give his subjects the impression that they are paying only the necessary taxes, nothing more: “para que sus vasallos lleven con mayor paciencia su trabajo, y den sus haciendas con menos repugnancia y disgusto, procure que entiendan que el cargarlos no es voluntario, sino pura necesidad... porque si ven que el Rey está rico, o que, no lo estando, hace gastos excesivos y superfluos... aflíganse terriblemente, y cobran odio y aborrecimiento al príncipe” (535). Both Ribadeneyra and don Quijote advise that the prince avoid greed, one of the seven deadly sins in the Christian tradition; however, they both emphasize not the sin itself but the reputation of greed, not for the salvation of their souls, but because if they cultivate this bad reputation they will risk provoking their subjects to rise up and take their position of power from them.

Finally, Sancho’s reputation culminates in the afternoon before the final trick when he uses don Quijote’s advice to create such good decrees that “hasta hoy se guardan en aquel lugar, y se nombran: Las constituciones del gran gobernador Sancho Panza” (1053). In this way, within the fiction of Don Quijote, even though Barataria is an imaginary republic created and controlled by the Duke and Duchess for their own amusement, Sancho’s reputation and the laws he creates actually modify reality. Within the imaginary republic of Barataria, his deeds gain him a good reputation among his entourage, even though they know that they are creating this fictional world around him. Outside the confines of the joke, on the other hand, Sancho creates “las constituciones del gran gobernador Sancho Panza,” laws which the real village, whatever its name may be, continues to observe in reality after Sancho leaves, despite the fact that Sancho’s governorship was doomed from the beginning as a prank orchestrated by the Duke and Duchess. In this way, Cervantes ridicules the dualistic nature of the reason-of-state tradition. Sancho puts into practice
don Quijote’s reason-of-state discourse and achieves the goal of that discourse with success. Nonetheless, the artificiality of Sancho’s governorship is continually highlighted, reminding the readers that Sancho’s whole enterprise is carefully controlled by the real princes, the Duke and the Duchess. This implicit referral back to reality, common in all early modern utopian discourse (Maravall), constantly provokes the readers to confront the half-serious, half-ludic cultivation of Sancho’s reputation with the very serious, even dangerous self-fashioning by real princes, whose portraits come into focus subsequent to Sancho’s downfall.

Throughout Part 2, Cervantes presents certain political examples that warn his readers about the dangers of the inherent ambiguity of reason-of-state discourse, when it is put into practice. In order to draw attention to the self-consciousness with which certain characters wield this and other discourses, Cervantes develops the mirror motif throughout the early chapters of Part 2, where first Sansón Carrasco, portraying the Caballero del Bosque o de los Espejos, and then the Caballero del Verde Gabán act precisely as mirrors for don Quijote. By way of an introduction to this motif, just after their meeting with the Company of Angulo el Malo, don Quijote discusses how comedy and actors do a great service for the republic: “poniéndonos un espejo a cada paso delante, donde se veen al vivo las acciones de la vida humana, y ninguna comparación hay que más al vivo nos represente lo que somos y lo que habemos de ser como la comedia y los comediantes; si no, dime: ¿no has visto tú representar alguna comedia adonde se introducen reyes, emperadores y pontífices, caballeros, damas y otros diversos personajes?” (719). This insistence on self-reflection very likely acted like a prompt for the early seventeenth-century readers to apply this topos to the text of Don Quijote itself, by recognizing the successive characters, from all walks of life, that appear throughout Part 2 as a kind of typological or emblematic representation of themselves and their peers (Ullman 228). In the case of kings, the mirror motif had been explicit in the speculum principis tradition since the Middle Ages, and it continued to be evoked in reason-of-state treatises. For example, in the preface to his translation of Botero, Herrera presents his Diez libros de la razon de estado to Philip II as a mirror for his son, Philip III, who may learn to imitate the ideal example of his own father, for the benefit of the whole kingdom (n.p.). In addition, it is well known that this same topos may be inverted, suggesting that the whole world is a stage. In this vein, Cervantes continually highlights the self-conscious fashioning of many of his characters’ public personae. As the years passed, early readers could have realized that Cervantes had carried out a sophisticated critique of their own static society, by confronting, precisely, “lo que somos y lo que habemos de ser.” Spain’s successive monarchs and noble lords cultivated and controlled the public representations of themselves, both written and spoken, in order to conserve their states. The Duke and the Duchess—a representation of one such pair of lords—appear in 2.30 and completely take over the proceedings for just under thirty chapters. The entire middle section of Part 2, therefore—not only the chapters related to Sancho’s governorship but also the portrait of the Duke and Duchess that emerges there—is central to Cervantes’ treatment of political thought and its application to real-life situations.

The comic and carnavalesque treatment to which the Duke and Duchess subject both don Quijote and Sancho throughout these chapters has been well documented (Redondo; Close). Nevertheless, a deeper, more serious portrait of the Duke and Duchess begins to emerge in chapter 2.48 and slowly builds up until the tension between don Quijote and the Duke practically explodes upon their farewell. In that chapter, doña Rodríguez, who in contrast to everyone else at the palace seems to believe that don Quijote truly is capable of righting wrongs, slips into don Quijote’s room at night, while Sancho is governing in Barataría, and asks him to challenge the son of a rich farmer who tricked her daughter by promising to marry her. Several times she has asked the Duke to
intervene, but he will not: “y es la causa que como el padre del burlador es tan rico y le presta
dineros y le sale por fiador de sus trampas por momentos, no le quiere descontentar ni dar
pesadumbre en ningún modo” (1021). She asks don Quijote to force the young man to marry her
daughter as he promised. Unfortunately, their discussion is interrupted by a pair of phantoms, who
turn out to be none other than the Duchess and Altsisidora. Angry with doña Rodríguez for speaking
to don Quijote about the bleeding procedures that her doctors regularly give to her in an attempt
to remove the “mal humor” (1022) with which they say she is filled, the Duchess barges in, puts
out the light and gives them both a beating with the help of her servant.

This same negative portrait of the Duke and Duchess is sustained from then on all the way
until the end of this section. In chapter 2.52 doña Rodríguez repeats her petition. She cannot turn
to the Duke, “porque pensar que el duque mi señor me ha de hacer justicia es pedir peras al olmo,
por la ocasión que ya a vuesa me rced en puridad tengo declarada” (1055). Doña Rodríguez reveals
that the Duke does not fulfill his function of looking out for the common good of his subjects;
rather, he wields his power for personal gain. Instead of helping doña Rodríguez, he hides the fact
that his friend has sent his son abroad. The Duke is motivated by reasons of state: if he were to
force his rich vassal’s son to marry the daughter of doña Rodríguez, then he would lose an
important source of the money he needs to maintain his power. Interestingly, the Duke accepts don
Quijote’s challenge on behalf of his vassal, picking up the glove that don Quijote throws to the
middle of the room, thus legally accepting the blame for condoning such misbehavior and
symbolically recognizing the injustice of his own state. Of course, on the surface of the narrative,
the Duke is jesting, and as we find out in chapter 2.56, he forms a plan to have another servant,
Tosilos, take the young man’s place, face don Quijote in a joust, and defeat him, taking care not
to kill him. Now, on the one hand the Duke is simply continuing to treat don Quijote as a clown,
as he and the Duchess have throughout these chapters; on the other, the seriousness with which he
accepts don Quijote’s challenge is revealed when Tosilos falls in love with doña Rodríguez’s
daughter and submits to don Quijote, so that he may marry her in reality: “de lo que [el duque]
quedó suspenso y colérico en estremo” (1087). Finally, just before don Quijote’s departure from
the castle in chapter 2.57, the Duke allows his anger to boil over, by feigning to challenge don
Quijote, after Altsisidora sings the knight-errant a song in which she accuses him of having stolen
three bandannas and some garters. Interpreted as a final expression of the Duke’s portrait, the
Duke’s joking admonition that don Quijote has behaved poorly, after having enjoyed his
hospitality, smacks of irony: underneath the jocular surface narrative of this entire section is a
subtle reason-of-state analysis of the Duke as a tyrant who abuses his power in order to conserve
his state.

Cervantes continues this presentation of political examples through reason-of-state
analysis after don Quijote and Sancho leave the palace of the Duke and Duchess. During their
journey to Barcelona, in the figure of the bandolero Roque Guinart Cervantes represents the same
problem, but from an inverted angle. While the Duke and the Duchess are ostensibly legitimate
rulers who take great care to cover up their corruption, Roque is a criminal leader who makes every
effort to behave like a good, honest prince, as far as his state permits him. Ironically (Weber), he
consciously cultivates the reputation of a good, Christian prince, while simultaneously performing
cruel acts out of necessity, in order to conserve his state. From the first words he utters to don
Quijote, it is clear that Roque Guinart is conscious of his own reputation, reassuring him that he
has not fallen into “las manos de algún cruel Osiris, sino en las de Roque Guinart, que tienen más
de compasivas que de rigurosas” (1119). Immediately, Guinart alludes to the traditional dichotomy
between tyrants, who use cruelty and fear to control their subjects, and good, Christian kings, who
rely on love. When dividing the booty equally among his men, he does so “con tanta legalidad y prudencia, que no pasó un punto ni defraudó nada de la justicia distributiva” (1124). When explaining to don Quijote how he ended up in this “estado,” Guinart reiterates that he is naturally “compasivo y bienintencionado” (1125). Later, when he treats a group of captives with “cortesía y liberalidad” (1128), Guinart continues to cultivate his reputation for decorum and benevolence, explaining that it is not his intention to harm soldiers or women, “especialmente a las que son principales” (1128). He even goes on to apologize for detaining them, depicting himself as one who simply must fulfill the obligations of his “mal oficio” (1128). His behavior has the desired effect on his victims, whom he leaves, “admirados de su nobleza, de su gallarda disposición y estraño proceder, teniéndole más por un Alejandro Magno que por ladrón conocido” (1128).

Nevertheless, when it comes to the conservation of his state, Guinart does not hesitate to use cruelty and fear to control his men. Guinart explains to don Quijote that he takes such care in distributive justice out of necessity: “Si no se guardase esta puntualidad con estos, no se podría vivir con ellos” (1125). Necessity is exactly the concept that Machiavelli employs in order to explain, in the Prince 18, that princes must be good when they can, but also know when to be bad when needed. Ribadeneyra himself translated this passage in order to refute it: “Y hase de entender que un príncipe, especialmente nuevo, no puede guardar todas las cosas por las cuales los hombres son tenidos por buenos, porque muchas veces, para conservar su estado, están obligados á hacer contra la fe, contra la caridad, contra la humanidad y contra la religion; pero es menester que de tal manera disponga su ánimo, que esté aparejado á mudar las velas segun los vientos y la variedad de la fortuna, y como dije arriba, no partirse del bien pudiendo; mas saber entrar en el mal cuado lo pidiere la necesidad” (520).

While the Duke and Duchess and Roque Guinart represent princes who employ reason of state discourse to justify the morally ambiguous methods they use in the wielding of their power, the encounter between Ricote and Sancho, just after the latter leaves his governorship of Barataria, provokes readers to contemplate the consequences of a real policy of the Spanish monarch. On the surface, Ricote agrees with the reasons of state used to justify the expulsion of the Moriscos in 1609. In order to express his understanding and even support for the measure, he refers to “los ruines y disparatados intentos que los nuestros tenían, y tales, que me parece que fue inspiración divina la que movió a Su Majestad a poner en efecto tan gallarda resolución” (1072). This reference to divine inspiration recalls the reason-of-state writers’ insistence that the king take the greatest care in following God’s providence, as we have seen in don Quijote’s advice to Sancho. Ricote himself concludes his justificatory speech by evoking reason-of-state discourse directly: “Finalmente, con justa razón fuimos castigados con la pena del destierro” (1072). However, within this same speech are found subversive counterarguments that undercut the ostensible and official justification (Hitchcock 181). Following his assertion that the expulsion was divinely inspired, Ricote draws a clear distinction between individuals and the majority: “no porque todos fuésemos culpados, que algunos había cristianos firmes y verdaderos, pero eran tan pocos, que no se podían
oponer a los que no lo eran” (1072). According to reasons of state, the king must look after the common good of his kingdom. Because the majority of Moriscos pose a threat to Spain, so the official argument goes, the fact that some individuals are true Christians is secondary. Nevertheless, Cervantes’s turn to specific examples, such as Ricote himself, who by his own admission was not a very good Christian, and Ricote’s daughter, Ana Felix, who was, highlights the injustice suffered by those individuals who are the victims of the laws supported by reason-of-state discourse.

When Ricote tells Sancho that “no era bien criar la sierpe en el seno” (1072), he is repeating a metaphor that, in addition to being applied to the Moriscos and Jews in Cervantes’s time (Vélez-Sainz 245), was often employed by the anti-Machiavellians to characterize the Politicos against which they were writing. In his Diez lamentaciones del miserable estado de los Atheistas de nuestros tiempos (1611), Jerónimo Gracián de la Madre de Dios laments that: “es dificultoso descubrir las serpientes, escondidas debaxo de las yeruas y flores destos hereges, que van con tanta Rhetorica y artificio solapando su abominable doctrina debaxo de razones dulces y aparentes” (191-92). Yet this same analysis could easily be applied to what the anti-Machiavellians called good, Christian reason of state. This is the insight that Cervantes brings forth in this episode: by turning reason-of-state arguments against themselves, he exposes their fickle, morally ambiguous nature.

In his own personal narrative, Ricote explains to Sancho why he decided to settle in Germany. Here, Ricote continues to employ the same reason-of-state vocabulary used to justify the expulsion, but from a moral point of view in direct opposition to the prevailing official position of the Spanish monarch as well as the Catholic Church. Ribadeneyra had declared that Machiavelli’s false reason of state teaches that kings should allow their subjects to practice whatever religion they choose, just so long as they remain obedient and peaceful: “Ésta es la libertad de conciencia que enseñan los politicos de nuestros tiempos; ésta la que han abrazado los herejes luteranos de Alemania: ésta la que han pretendido algunos rebeldes a Dios y a su señor natural de los estados de Flandes” (482). Ribendeyra is vehemently opposed to this viewpoint: “no debe el príncipe Cristiano permitir herejes y hombres de varias y contrarias sectas en sus estados, si quiere cumplir bien con el oficio y obligación de católico príncipe; y que es imposible que hagan buena liga el católico y el hereje en una misma república, y que no sucedan por esta mezcla grandes alteraciones y revueltas, que son la ruina y destrucción de los reinos y estados” (482). Later, men who were in favor of the expulsion of the Moriscos borrowed explicitly this same language and applied it to the question at hand. In 1601, Juan de Ribera, for example, refers to the same políticos to support his viewpoint on the problem posed by the Moriscos: “principalmente en tiempo que corre tanto la secta de los políticos, y que vemos que por ella es permitido a los vasallos propios y naturales vivir en la ley que quieren” (Márquez Villanueva 279). In contrast, Ricote employs the same vocabulary, in an opposite, positive sense: “Pasé a Italia y llegué a Alemania, y allí me pareció que se podía vivir con más libertad, porque sus habitadores no miran en muchas delicadezas: cada uno vive como quiere, porque en la mayor parte della se vive con libertad de conciencia” (1073). From his point of view, it is a good thing that Germans practice “freedom of conscience,” because, quite simply, he will not become the target of persecution because of who he is.

By ironically inverting reason-of-state vocabulary in Ricote’s words, Cervantes exposes the contradictory, ambiguous nature of the prevailing Spanish political discourse of his time. As

5 Ramírez Araujo, Márquez Villanueva (277-85) and Hitchcock (182-83) all point out how authors who supported the expulsion were opposed to conceding “libertad de conciencia” to the Moriscos.
the examples of the Duke and Duchess and Roque Guinart show, all kinds of princes and lords—legitimate and illegitimate, charitable and selfish—could allude to reasons of state in order to justify their actions, irrespective of whether or not they knew in their hearts that they were looking out for the common good of their subjects. Ultimately, this is the danger that Cervantes points out throughout Part 2 of *Don Quijote*. Just as the anti-Machiavellian reason-of-state discourse developed out of a desire to adapt Machiavelli’s ideas to the Catholic worldview by hiding the fact that they were doing so, by its very nature it gives those who employ it too much moral freedom in the exercise of their power. For it is impossible for everyone else to know what is really hidden in the hearts of the powerful—Christian charity or corrupt selfishness.
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